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Abstract 
 
Recruit, Retain, Separate, and Reward: 
Military Pension Policy and the American Experience 
 
Brandon Jason Archuleta, M.P.Aff. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
SUPERVISOR: Jeremi Suri 
 
This report is part of a larger dissertation project and examines the American 
political development of the veterans’ pension policy subsystem and its transformation 
into the military personnel policy subsystem. Despite extensive academic literature on the 
history of veterans’ pensions, no scholar has pursued this research agenda through the 
lens of the dynamic policy subsystem. This report argues that from the nation’s founding 
through World War II, military pension policy developed by way of an evolving policy 
subsystem with the help (and hindrance) of elite policy entrepreneurs, interest group 
lifecycles, bureaucratic consolidation, and legislative reorganization. Further, subsystem 
actors and institutions leveraged military pensions at various points in American history 
to recruit, retain, separate, and reward service members. Drawing from the historical 
record, original archival research, and previous scholarly works, this report makes four 
significant findings. First, a dynamic policy subsystem emerged in the wake of the Civil 
War and persisted well into the twentieth century. Second, powerful veterans’ interest 
groups come about in the wake of war, thrive in the policymaking process for a period of 
time, and slowly fade away making room for new veterans’ groups to influence policy. 
Third, bureaucratic consolidation of disparate governmental agencies handling veterans 
issues in the post-World War era facilitated bureaucratic innovation and autonomy, 
ushering in a professional workforce with streamlined processes to ensure veterans 
services were delivered in a more timely and effective manner. Finally, legislative 
reorganization in the wake of World War II effectively split veterans’ pension policy and 
military personnel policy into two separate policy subsystems, minimizing the scope of 
vii 
 
conflict with regard to military personnel policy. This work reveals historical insights for 
contemporary defense and military policymaking in the post-Iraq/Afghan war era and 
opens the path for future research agendas exploring the military personnel policy 
subsystem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
Revolution and the Origins of Military Pensions Policy................................................. 2 
Theoretical Underpinnings .............................................................................................. 7 
Policy Subsystems ....................................................................................................... 7 
Policy Entrepreneurs .................................................................................................. 12 
Bureaucratic Consolidation ....................................................................................... 13 
Plan for the Report ........................................................................................................ 14 
Preview of the Argument ........................................................................................... 15 
CHAPTER 2: CIVIL WAR AND SUBSYSTEM FORMATION ................................... 17 
Civil War Pensions, 1861-1879 .................................................................................... 17 
Rise of the Policy Subsystem ........................................................................................ 21 
Pension Committees .................................................................................................. 23 
Partisanship in the Pension Bureau ........................................................................... 25 
Pension Attorneys, Claim Agents, and the Grand Army of the Republic ................. 31 
Presidents, Politics, and Pensions .............................................................................. 38 
Sectionalism and the Tariff ........................................................................................ 42 
Watchdog Media and Growing Public Concern ........................................................ 43 
Confederate Pensions .................................................................................................... 48 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 53 
CHAPTER 3: WORLD WAR I AND SUBSYSTEM EVOLUTION.............................. 55 
The Doughboys Sign-up for War Risk Insurance ......................................................... 56 
Influential Veterans’ Organizations .............................................................................. 61 
The Grand Army of the Republic Fades Away ......................................................... 61 
Veterans of Foreign Wars Organize .......................................................................... 62 
The American Legion Forms in Paris, 1919.............................................................. 64 
The Harding Administration Battles Congress ............................................................. 66 
Consolidating the Veterans’ Bureaucracy ..................................................................... 68 
ix 
 
Scandal at the Veterans’ Bureau ................................................................................ 77 
The World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 .............................................. 78 
Bonus Expeditionary Force Invades Washington ..................................................... 81 
From the Veterans’ Bureau to the Veterans’ Administration ....................................... 82 
National Defense Efficiency Act of 1935 ..................................................................... 85 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 86 
CHAPTER 4: WORLD WAR II AND SUBSYSTEM TRANSFORMATION .............. 88 
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 ...................................................................... 89 
The American Legion Weighs In .............................................................................. 90 
An Alternative Form of Compensation ..................................................................... 91 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946........................................................................ 93 
The Joint Committee Recommends Restructure ....................................................... 93 
National Security Act of 1947 ....................................................................................... 96 
The Personnel Policy Board Advises Secretary Forrestal ......................................... 97 
Secretary Marshall Nominates a Personnel Expert ................................................... 98 
Officer Personnel Act of 1947 .................................................................................... 100 
General Eisenhower Goes to Washington ............................................................... 101 
Separating the “Deadwood” .................................................................................... 102 
An Institutional Personnel Framework .................................................................... 104 
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 105 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 107 
More Questions ........................................................................................................... 109 
Toward a Theory of Efficient Policy Subsystems ....................................................... 110 
Future Research Agendas ............................................................................................ 110 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 112 
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 120 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
When Gertrude Janeway died in 2003, she was still getting a monthly cheque (sic) for 
$70 from the Veterans Administration—for a military pension earned by her late 
husband, John, on the Union side of the American civil war that ended in 1865. The pair 
had married in 1927, when he was 81 and she was 18. The amount may have been 
modest but the entitlement spanned three centuries, illustrating just how long pension 
commitments can last.
1
 
        The Economist 
The excerpt above highlights the importance and neglect of military pension 
policies. Who would have thought the US government still paid Civil War pensions? In 
fact, in 2012, the Veterans’ Administration acknowledged that it still paid two pensions 
to elderly relatives of Civil War veterans.
2
 This leads to a natural question – do military 
pensions still work like this? The short answer is no. To better understand current 
military pension policies, one must understand the role veterans’ pensions have played in 
American political development.  
After more than a decade at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, returning soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen have earned the collective thanks of a 
grateful nation. Despite this sincere appreciation, however, recent defense budget cuts 
raise questions about the future of the All-Volunteer Force. Among them is the impact of 
potential changes in military retirement policy on recruitment and retention. While these 
questions are cause for concern, the American military has been in this position before. 
This is exactly why understanding the policy’s history is so important – to draw 
                                                          
1 “Falling Short,” The Economist, 07 April 2011. Available from 
http://www.economist.com/node/18502013; Internet. 
2 Mike Baker, “Costs of US Wars Linger for over 100 Year,” Associated Press, 19 March 2013. Available 
from http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-costs-us-wars-linger-over-100-years; Internet 
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informative and timely lessons for current policy debates. As such, this master’s report 
seeks to examine the political development of veterans’ pension policy in the wake of 
three American wars: the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. An historical 
examination of this sort will highlight recurring political themes leading to the 
development of current military pension policy and inform subsequent research.    
Revolution and the Origins of Military Pensions Policy 
Military pensions have a long and, at times, controversial history in American 
political development. This controversy draws from the distinction between disability and 
service based pensions. Soon after the outbreak of the American Revolution, the 
Continental Congress acknowledged the need to explore a disability or “invalid-pension 
system” for those wounded in the service of the new republic. In a letter dated 2 June 
1776, General Nathaniel Greene wrote to John Adams “urging that provision be made for 
disabled officers and soldiers.”3 On 20 June 1776, the Continental Congress appointed a 
five member committee
4
 to explore the matter and by 26 August, the members adopted 
pension legislation stipulating half-pay for life for the severely wounded and disabled.
5
   
Service pensions were another matter. General George Washington expressed 
serious misgivings about a service pension when soldiers first raised the question. His 
                                                          
3 Henry Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1918), 19.  
4 Worthington Chauncey Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, vol. v, 1776, ed. Library of Congress, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), 469. 
5 Ibid, 702-705. 
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fear revolved around creating a heavy debt burden for the colonies and his belief that the 
public would loathe the idea.
6
 In November 1777, Washington writes: 
The allowance of Land to the disabled Officers may be proper enough, but will not half 
pay be attended with enormous expence? (sic) and would not this, and allowing half pay 
to the Officers of reduced regiments at the end of the War, add such weight to a debt 
already, and probably will be, of such magnitude, as to sink the Colonies under the load 
of it, and give great disgust to the people at large?
7
  
 
Beyond Washington’s misgivings, public concerns regarding military service pensions 
were twofold. First, colonists were reluctant to form a standing, professional army. 
Second, most Americans believed that monetary incentives were contrary to the citizen-
soldier ideal.
8
  
By December 1777, a mere month later, Washington reconsidered service 
pensions as the harsh winter at Valley Forge took its toll and his fledgling Continental 
army began to fall apart at the seams. Washington realized the “necessity of some better 
provision for binding the Officers by the tye (sic) of Interest to the Service (as No day, 
nor scarce hour passes without the offer of a resigned Commission) otherwise I much 
doubt the practicability of holding the army together much longer.”9 From December 
1777 through January 1779, General Washington pressed Congress to enact a “half-pay 
for life” pension measure that would incentivize continued military service and tie 
                                                          
6 Laura Jensen, Patriots Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 50. 
7 “Remarks on Plan of Field Officers for Remodeling the Army,” in The Writings of George Washington, 
vol. 10, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931), 125-126. 
8 Jensen, 50. 
9 Fitzpatrick, 197. 
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Continental officers to the cause of freedom.
10
 By 1780, after much bitter negotiation, 
Congress adopted a half-pay for life pension plan that would provide for veterans and 
widows alike.
11
  
Three years later, however, the Continental Congress had yet to fulfill its financial 
obligation to serving soldiers and veterans as plans to disband the Continental army 
developed. Infuriated by Congress’ empty promises, a few hundred soldiers from billets 
in Lancaster, Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia city barracks demonstrated outside 
Independence Hall. Though the protest was largely peaceful, Congress fled Philadelphia 
for Princeton, New Jersey in fear of its own army. In Princeton, the Congress continued 
its business, leading some to argue that were it not for the “Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783,” 
the nation’s capital might be Philadelphia rather than Washington, DC.12 While this was 
the first time soldiers and veterans marched against the federal government, it would not 
be the last.   
Congress revisited disability pensions several times over the next fifteen years. In 
1778, “all who had fought for the common defense…were embraced within the scope of 
the invalid-pension system.” In 1782, “all soldiers sick or wounded [and] unfit for duty,” 
preferring discharge to continued service, were eligible for $5 per month in lieu of 
                                                          
10 Glasson, 25-27 
11 Jensen, 56-59. 
12 Kenneth R. Bowling, “New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the 
Close of the War for Independence,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 101, no. 4 
(1977), 419-420. Bowling draws on primary sources from the period to highlight the widely held disgust 
and anger continental soldiers held toward the Congress under the new Articles of Confederation. 
Additionally, he alludes to the mistrust and animosity congressmen felt for John Dickinson, President of 
Pennsylvania, for not intervening to protect the federal government.    
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regular pay. In 1785, Congress recommended a uniform plan to administer the pension 
program across the states. Finally, legislation in 1788 limited the timeline for petition and 
required veterans to furnish proof of service or service-related-disability.
13
 As a result of 
these and other pension bills, the United States spent $120,000 a year on military 
pensions by 1816, worth approximately $1.67 million in 2014.
14
  
Although support for revolutionary war pensions would ebb and flow for the next 
several decades through emotionally charged national debate and congressional 
deliberation, George Washington proved to be the first elite policy entrepreneur to 
vigorously lobby Congress for a pension measure. Seeing the central role service 
pensions played in keeping his fledgling army intact, Washington realized pensions could 
be effectively used to recruit and retain a wartime army. Scholar Henry Glasson writes, 
“In a long bloody war, Washington thought patriotism might accomplish much but that it 
would not endure unassisted by interest.”15 
In 1817, with congressional precedent set during the Revolution, former 
Continental officer, revolutionary veteran, and President of the United States James 
Monroe also advocated for a revolutionary pension. In his first annual message to 
Congress, Monroe states: 
                                                          
13 See Glasson, 21-23. 
14 Ibid, 64. Conversion formula drawn from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 1816 Price x (2014 
CPI / 1816 CPI) = $120,000 x (708.7 / 51) = $1,667,529.41. Available from 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/teacher/calc/hist1800.cfm; Internet.    
15 Ibid, 28. 
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In contemplating the happy situation of the United States, our attention is drawn with 
peculiar interest to the surviving officers and soldiers of our Revolutionary army, who so 
eminently contributed by their services to lay its foundation. Most of those very 
meritorious citizens have paid the debt of nature and gone to repose. It is believed that 
among the survivors there are some not provided for by existing laws, who are reduced to 
indigence and even to real distress. These men have a claim on the gratitude of their 
country, and it will do honor to their country to provide for them. The lapse of a few 
years more and the opportunity will be forever lost; indeed, so long already has been the 
interval that the number to be benefitted by any provision which may be made will not be 
great.
16
 
 
On Christmas Eve 1817, the House of Representatives passed such a measure, per 
the President’s eloquent plea, for those veterans suffering from “indigence” and incapable 
of labor. The Senate followed suit soon thereafter in 1818. This iteration of pension 
legislation provided $20 per month for every officer and $8 per month for every soldier 
who fought in the Revolution and met the indigence and disability provisions.
17
  
 Washington’s initial efforts to frame military pensions as necessary to recruit and 
retain an army and Monroe’s later efforts to frame pensions as a matter of national 
gratitude and reward for service is telling. This precedent, as subsequent wars and other 
scholars have demonstrated, reveals a pattern in which wartime pensions pass the 
Congress to recruit and retain citizen-soldiers and old age pensions, years later, serve to 
relieve poverty among the same veterans’ community. 
 I contend that this pattern comes about by way of a dynamic policy subsystem 
that emerges in the wake of the Civil War, evolves through World War I, and finally 
transforms into the subsystems policymakers know today following World War II. First, 
                                                          
16 James Monroe, “First Annual Message,” December 12th 1817, The American Presidency Project, UCSB; 
Available from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29459; Internet.  
17 See Jensen. 70-71. See also Glasson, 67. 
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policymakers rely on military pensions to recruit and retain service members in the midst 
of a wartime emergency. Next, in the wake of war, prominent veterans’ service 
organizations form to foster camaraderie and provide policy advocacy within that 
veterans’ community, including more generous pension benefits for their service and 
sacrifice. As time passes, one generation of veterans gives way to a new generation of 
veterans. Similarly, language framing pensions a tool to recruit and retain gives way to 
language framing pensions as rewards for service. The pattern repeats.    
Theoretical Underpinnings  
While scholars like Henry Glasson, Richard Bensel, Theda Skocpol, Laura 
Jensen, and Stephen Ortiz have written extensively about veterans pensions in the context 
of American social policy, no scholar has viewed this topic through the lens of the 
dynamic policy subsystem. This report draws on the historical record, original archival 
research, and prior scholarship to illustrate the evolution of the veterans’ pension policy 
subsystem and document its transformation into the military personnel policy subsystem.    
Policy Subsystems 
According to political scientist Daniel McCool, a policy subsystem is closely 
related to an iron triangle, sub-government, or policy monopoly. The most common and 
often misapplied of these is the iron-triangle. McCool draws on James Thurber, defining 
an iron triangle as a “relatively closed policy arena emphasizing stable relations among a 
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limited number of participants (i.e. Congress, bureaucracies, and interest groups).”18 
While the iron triangle is quite narrow in scope, a policy subsystem is broader and much 
more inclusive. McCool defines a policy subsystem as “a coalition of policy-influencing 
and policy-making entities that work together via one or more identifiable strategies in 
response to conflict or potential conflict over policy.”19 Imagine a dynamic network of 
various institutional and individual experts pushing and pulling policies towards preferred 
ends, using any all means necessary. As a result, subsystems aim to maintain stability by 
retaining control of the issues in question, thereby limiting access and potential threats. 
This subsystem stability comes about through institutional structure and issue 
definition.
20
 More clearly, institutional arrangements among familiar actors and agencies 
perpetuate a particular policy definition that enables the subsystem to maintain its control 
over said definition.  
The policy subsystem is comprised of services actors and institutions. Generally, 
these actors and institutions include bureaucrats and bureaucracies with jurisdiction over 
the policy area, the Congressional committees and subcommittees that wield legislative 
and oversight power over the policy area, interested parties (including especially 
advocacy groups, industry, and business), media, academic experts, and the policy’s 
target population.   
                                                          
18 Daniel McCool, “The Subsystem Family of Concepts: A Critique and a Proposal,” Political Research 
Quarterly 51, no. 2, (1998), 551. 
19 Ibid, 558. 
20 See Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, [1993] 2009). 
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Policy scholars have gone to great lengths to develop subsystem typologies 
elucidating the subsystem’s role in policy development.21 McCool contributes to this 
literature with his two-by-two conception of autonomous, dominant/dissident, pluralized, 
and conflictual subsystems.
22
 The military personnel policy subsystem, especially with 
regard to current retirement policies, most definitely meets McCool’s description of an 
autonomous subsystem. He writes:  
In this strategic context, the subsystem on one side of an issue virtually controls policy, 
due to overwhelming political power in the face of weak opposition. They have a great 
deal of autonomy from other political forces, and use their strategic overhead to maintain 
their competitive advantage. Because of their political dominance, subsystems operating 
in this context can request desired outcome benefits in a zero-sum environment because 
the losers are not sufficiently powerful to make their losses a political issue…Perhaps the 
best example of this today is veterans’ policy, which has continued to receive 
considerable government largess even in times of budgetary stringency.  
 
 McCool identifies “veterans’ policy” as having “continued to receive considerable 
government largess even in times of budgetary stringency.” While McCool highlights 
veterans’ policy to illustrate his point, he actually misses the long historical view of 
veterans’ pension policy and its chaotic political development over the course of 
American history. In fact, veterans’ policy, especially with regard to disability and 
service pensions, has evolved into an autonomous subsystem over the past century and a 
half. Using McCool’s own typology, veterans’ policy in the post-Civil War era and 
beyond might better be thought of in terms of a dominant/dissident policy subsystem. He 
defines this subsystem as follows: 
                                                          
21 See Jeffrey Worsham, Other People’s Money: Policy Change, Congress, and Bank Regulation, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997). 
22 McCool, 562. 
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In this strategic context, subsystem(s) on one side of the issue dominate, but their 
opponents have sufficient political strength to have at least some influence on policy. The 
dominant subsystem exercises considerable control over the allocation of outcome costs 
and benefits, but often has to resort to cooptation through allocation in an effort to 
mollify the dissident subsystem…The dissident subsystem is quite effective at pointing 
out the large outcome costs incurred by the policies of the dominant subsystem, and can 
occasionally extract largess from the domain of the more powerful subsystem…In the 
dominant subsystem, strategic overhead is split between maintaining close ties within the 
coalition, and finding ways of coopting opponents without surrendering control of 
policymaking.
23
  
   
Finally, subsystems also have territorial, functional, and substantive dimensions.
24
 
For instance, policy scholars Paul Sabatier and Christopher Weible offer state water 
policy as an example of this and assert that such a specific policy area will have 
researchers, advocacy groups, and journalists dedicated to the issue with some level of 
expertise. McCool agrees, acknowledging that policy subsystems often include lobbyists, 
intellectuals, “policy wonks,” and other wealthy elites with a stake in controlling 
government.
25
 This certainly is true of military (territorial) pension 
(functional/substantive) policy.  
With these subsystem typologies as a framework for understanding military 
pension policy, when new subsystems, agencies, or policy entrepreneurs enter the fray 
and encroach on the existing institutional arrangement, policies can be manipulated and 
redefined, leading to subsystem breakdown and policy change. Therefore, the 
                                                          
23 Ibid, 563. 
24 Paul Sabatier and Christopher Weible, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and 
Clarification,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul Sabatier, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 192. 
See also Matthew Zafonte and Paul Sabatier, “Shared Beliefs and Imposed Interdependencies as 
Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping Subsystems,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 10, no. 4, 
(1998): 473-505.   
25 McCool, 553. 
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subsystem’s best interest is to keep a tight grip on institutional structure and issue 
definition to maintain its primacy over the policy process. 
In this case, the veterans’ pension policy subsystem and later the military 
personnel policy subsystem share four primary goals: to recruit, retain, separate and 
reward service members and veterans. First, subsystem actors must develop the pension 
and personnel policies necessary and sufficient to recruit and retain a wartime military. 
Second, subsystem actors must leverage those same pension and personnel policies to 
separate service members from the military once the government has determined that 
their service is complete. Finally, subsystem actors aim to do right by the target 
population – soldiers and veterans – and often wish to reward their service when 
financially feasible. 
Policymakers used veterans’ pension policies for all four of these purposes at 
different points in American history. Initially, General Washington and the Continental 
Congress used service pensions to retain soldiers in the fledgling Continental Army, 
including especially the officer corps. Next, President Lincoln and Union lawmakers 
relied on disability pensions to recruit an army at the outset of the Civil War. Following 
World War I, Congress passed legislation – over presidential veto – to reward service 
members with adjusted compensation, or “bonuses,” to compensate for low overseas 
combat pay. Finally, General Eisenhower lobbied Congress for an “up or out” promotion 
system coupled with a 20 year retirement policy to separate senior personnel from the 
12 
 
ranks. These four brief examples highlight instances of the subsystem pursing its various 
policy goals and will serve as recurring themes throughout this report.            
Policy Entrepreneurs  
The veterans’ pension policy subsystem, while powerful, did not operate alone.  
Rather, detailing the political development of military pension policy also requires an 
appreciation for the role of the policy entrepreneur from the American Revolution 
through World War II. Drawing from the political scientist Nikolaos Zahariadis, I define 
a policy entrepreneur as an advocate and powerbroker who manipulates the problem, 
politics, and policy streams of an issue during a specified window of opportunity to 
advance a particular policy agenda.
26
 The most successful policy entrepreneurs must have 
access, resources, and a strategy. While policy entrepreneurs are only one aspect of the 
pension story, I pay particular attention on the role of elite policy entrepreneurs – 
American presidents, popular members of Congress, and prominent military officers, 
among others – who enjoyed the requisite access, resources, and strategies necessary to 
champion military pension policy. For instance, Presidents Washington, Monroe, 
Coolidge, and Harding, along with Congressman Sam Rayburn and General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, all played prominent roles in the evolution of military pension policy. These 
policy entrepreneurs leveraged social constructions of the military, veterans, and national 
security as a means to advance their policy preferences. 
                                                          
26 Nikolaos Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects” in Theories 
of the Policy Process, ed. Paul Sabatier, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 74. 
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Bureaucratic Consolidation  
 The bureaucracy literature is rich with works on the historical development of 
America’s most powerful and interesting agencies. Political Scientist Daniel P. Carpenter 
is among the most prolific bureaucracy scholars in the field. His 2001 book, The Forging 
of Bureaucratic Autonomy, is theoretically rich, empirically sound, and relevant to my 
work. Carpenter asserts that bureaucratic autonomy prevails when agencies can establish 
political legitimacy, including a reputation for expertise, efficiency, moral protection, and 
a uniquely diverse and complex set of ties to organized interests and the media. A strong 
bureaucratic reputation and network induces politicians to defer to the wishes of agency 
officials, giving the bureaucracy wide latitude to operate and innovate, hence 
“autonomy.” 27    
 Drawing from Carpenter’s argument, I contend that bureaucratic consolidation of 
multiple disparate agencies into one organization can facilitate political legitimacy with 
regard to expertise and efficiency. Additionally, institutions designed to deliver veterans’ 
services and pensions benefit from moral protection, further solidifying that legitimacy. 
Finally, bureaucratic consolidation allows organization leaders to combine their diverse 
and multiple network ties to media and interest groups. While there are instances of 
bureaucratic consolidation doing more harm than good,
28
 when executives take care to 
                                                          
27 See Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
28 See Peter J. May, Samuel Workman, and Bryan D. Jones, “Organizing Attention: Responses of the 
Bureaucracy to Agenda Disruption,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18, (2008), 
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restructure and reorganize while the core mission remains the same, bureaucratic 
consolidation can, in fact, facilitate bureaucratic autonomy.           
Plan for the Report 
I argue that from the nation’s founding through the second World War, veterans’ 
pension policy developed by way of an evolving policy subsystem with the help (and 
hindrance) of elite policy entrepreneurs, bureaucratic consolidation, interest group 
lifecycles, and legislative reorganization along the way. Far from autonomous, this 
dominant subsystem faced several challenges from dissident actors and institutions. 
Consequently, veterans’ pension policy has not always been controlled by an insular 
policy subsystem. On the contrary, veterans’ pension policy was once an issue that 
pervaded American life, as this report will demonstrate. In fact, this issue was so much a 
part of public psyche from the Civil War through World War II, that no subsystem could 
possibly have controlled it with complete autonomy. As such, this report aims to illustrate 
the political development of veterans’ pension policy, explain its transformation, and 
document the rise of the military personnel policy subsystem that policymakers know 
today.  
I begin this exploration with one primary and three secondary research questions. 
First and foremost, how did the veterans’ pension policy subsystem develop over the 
course of American history and lead to the formation of the military personnel policy 
                                                                                                                                                                             
517-541. May, Workman, and Jones argue that reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security led 
to an attention and policy coherence oriented towards terrorism at the expense of disaster relief. 
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subsystem? Second, how did policy entrepreneurs and focusing events bring new 
attention to veterans’ pension policy following the Civil War, World War I, and World 
War II? Third, how did lawmakers frame veterans’ pension policies as strategic 
incentives to recruit, retain, separate, and reward service members and veterans? Finally, 
how did budgetary considerations of surplus or deficit spending influence the policy 
debates after each war?  
Preview of the Argument 
In short, I argue that from the Civil War through World War II, veterans’ pension 
policy developed by way of an evolving policy subsystem with the help (and hindrance) 
of elite policy entrepreneurs, bureaucratic consolidation, interest group lifecycles, and 
legislative reorganization. This paper illustrates the political development of veterans’ 
pension policy and explains the rise of the military personnel policy subsystem by testing 
four hypotheses: subsystem formation, bureaucratic consolidation, interest group 
lifecycle, and subsystem split. 
1. Subsystem formation hypothesis: A robust veterans’ pension policy subsystem 
emerged in the wake of the Civil War. (Chapter 2). 
  
2. Interest group lifecycle hypothesis: Veterans’ interest groups emerge in the wake of 
conflict, thrive in the policymaking process for a period of time, and fade away as a 
generation of veterans passes away and a new generation emerges. (Chapter 3).  
 
3. Bureaucratic consolidation hypothesis: Bureaucratic consolidation during the 
interwar period raised the visibility of veterans’ policy within government and 
professionalized and streamlined the delivery of veterans’ services. (Chapter 3). 
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4. Subsystem split hypothesis: Veterans’ pension policy and military personnel policy 
effectively split into two separate subsystems in the wake of World War II, 
significantly reducing the number of institutions and actors interested in military 
personnel policy. (Chapter 4).   
 
 
The plan for this report breaks down into four subsequent chapters. First, chapter 
two documents the rise of the dynamic veterans’ pension policy subsystem in the wake of 
the Civil War. Second, chapter three explores the subsystem’s evolution through World 
War I and beyond, including sections on veterans’ advocacy groups, bureaucratic 
consolidation, the World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924, and the Bonus 
Expeditionary Forces’ march on Washington. Next, chapter four examines the veterans’ 
pension policy subsystem’s transformation into the military pension policy subsystem, 
documenting four major pieces of legislation: the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 
1944, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, National Security Act of 1947, and Officer 
Personnel Act of 1947. Finally, chapter five offers a preview of my larger dissertation 
project with an introduction to an expanded theory of autonomous policy subsystems and 
closing remarks on future research agendas. 
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CHAPTER 2: CIVIL WAR AND SUBSYSTEM FORMATION 
Following a brief history of Civil War pensions from 1861 to 1879, this chapter 
examines the rise of the veterans’ pension policy subsystem and tests subsystem 
formation hypothesis. In short, I argue that a robust veterans’ pension policy subsystem 
emerged in the wake of the Civil War. As such, the historical record and previous 
scholarship on Civil War pensions should point to a dynamic and fluid interaction among 
five institutions: congressional committees of jurisdiction, bureaucracies dedicated to 
veterans’ services and pensions, powerful veterans’ lobbies and influential private 
interests, an attentive media, and policy entrepreneurs attempting to break into the 
subsystem.     
Civil War Pensions, 1861-1879 
With an historical precedent set during the Revolution and affirmed following the 
War of 1812,
29
 Union lawmakers considered military pension policy once again as the 
nation found itself torn asunder by gruesome civil war. On 22 July 1861, Congress 
authorized President Lincoln to raise 500,000 soldiers for the Union cause against the 
Confederacy. Buried in section six of “An Act to authorize the Employment of 
Volunteers to aid in enforcing the Laws and protecting Public Property,” was a provision 
of $100 to any volunteer (their widow or living relative) who would be wounded or 
disabled in the service of his country, in addition to overdue pay, allowances, and 
                                                          
29 See Glasson, 108-113 for a thorough treatment of military pensions for veterans of the War of 1812. 
Congress enacted disability pensions in 1816 and service pensions for living survivors and widows in 1871, 
contingent upon loyalty to the Union during the Civil War.  
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disability benefits.
30
 Rather than simply rely on patriotism to recruit an army, as General 
Washington originally had, Union lawmakers looked to pensions as an effective policy 
instrument for wartime recruitment and retention.
31
 No doubt, reluctant patriots were 
comforted by the fact that should the unthinkable happen, their families would be 
financially cared for.   
The following year, Congress went even further with the General Law Pension 
Act of 1862. This was the most generous disability pension law to date as it expanded 
eligibility beyond benefits for veterans, widows, and orphans and extended them to 
mothers and sisters as well.
32
 Even more notable, the pension act signed into law on 14 
July 1862 created an open ended clause for which any service member wounded in the 
service of his nation since 4 March 1861 would be entitled to disability benefits. 
Additionally, the statute did not specify “volunteer,” thus leaving an opening for 
conscripts to claim their benefits as well. Most important, Union loyalty was required of 
any beneficiary.
33 
By 1890, that stipulation would become a point of serious contention.  
 Though military pension scholar, Henry Glasson, describes passage of the 
Pension Act of 1862 as “rather uneventful” in Congress as public attention focused on 
                                                          
30 US Statutes at Large, 37th Congress, Session 2, Chapter 166, 270. Available from 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsllink.html; Internet. 
31 This is what political scientist, Peter May dubbed “Instrumental Policy Learning” in his 1992 article, 
“Policy Learning and Failure.” By the time of the Civil War, lawmakers had become accustomed to the 
notion that disability and service pensions were necessary in times of war.   
32 Jensen, 211. 
33 US Statutes at Large, 566-569. This paragraph draws heavily from the Pension Act of 1862 as enacted 
into law.  
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more pressing matters,
34
 there is evidence of members advocating passage despite 
reservations with the bill’s specifics. While much of the floor debate in the House of 
Representatives on 13 May 1862 focused on bureaucratic implementation of the proposed 
pension policy, a second term Congressman from Indiana, William Holman, raised 
serious objections to the bill’s details rather than its premise. With regard to the rank 
based pension scale, Representative Holman stated,  
The object in making the [monthly salary] discrimination is to induce the best material 
which the country can afford to join the Army…The Government engaged to pay higher 
salaries to officers and less salaries to soldiers, while in the service; the engagement must 
be carried out. But this bill proposed to pay a [pension] bounty on the part of Government 
in consideration of hardships endured, the perils incurred, the sufferings borne, by those 
soldiers who may be disabled in the service of the country, an expression of gratitude and 
a provision against want…I know of no reason why the soldier who shoulders a musket 
and loses a leg or an arm in battle, or his wife and children, if he is slain, should receive 
less sympathy or aid from the Government than the colonel, the brigadier general, or the 
major general who may have suffered a similar loss.
35
        
 
Although Congressman Holman’s efforts failed to win the support of his 
colleagues, his inclination towards pension equity – a recurring theme in future pension 
debates – is quite clear. Interestingly, Mr. Holman largely agrees that rank based salaries 
were necessary to recruit and retain talented soldiers for the Union cause, and even 
frames it that way. However, he sees similarly structured pension policies as 
discriminatory because they ought to be “an expression of gratitude and a provision 
against want.” Even before the bloodiest battles of the Civil War, politicians openly 
discussed and framed salaries and pensions as instruments to recruit, retain, and reward.  
                                                          
34 Glasson, 128. 
35 Represenatative William Holman, “Remarks on the House Floor,” 13 May 1862. Congressional Globe, 
37
th
 Congress, 2
nd
 Session, 1861-1862, Part 3, 2102. 
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 Despite little controversy in Congress, the Pension Act of 1862 raised concerns 
about burdening the public purse. The Pension Bureau received some 4,411 applications 
from wounded veterans by 15 November 1862.
36
 Pension Commissioner Joseph Barrett 
predicted that an annual appropriation of $7 million would be sufficient to cover Civil 
War pensions in any given year.
37
 However, by 1865, annual payments exceeded $8.5 
million.
38
 Despite Commissioner Barrett’s prediction, early “apprehensions in some 
quarters of an extravagant, if not unsupportable, annual burden resulting from the law” 
proved to be warranted.
39
       
 Social policy scholar, Laura Jensen contends, “Not surprisingly, the outbreak of 
the war had led immediately to Congressional consideration of military disability 
benefits.” This reveals a telling pattern. Since the Revolution, Congress authorized 
disability pensions at the outset or soon after the end of conflict, growing more generous 
over time; whereas, generous service pensions tended to come years, even decades, after 
the end of war.
40
 This was true of the Pension Act of 1818 for veterans of the Revolution, 
the Pension Act of 1871 for veterans of the War of 1812, and the Dependent Pension Act 
of 1890 for Union veterans of the Civil War. With the exception of half-pay service 
                                                          
36 “The Pension Bureau; Abstract of the Annual Report of Hon. Joseph H. Barrett, Commission of 
Pensions.” The New York Times, 13 December 1862. Available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/1862/12/03/news/pension-bureau-abstract-annual-report-hon-joseph-h-barrett-
commissioner-pensions.html; Internet. 
37 Glasson, 129. 
38 “Pension Bureau, Report of Commissioner Barrett.” The New York Times, 09 December 1865. Available 
from http://www.nytimes.com/1865/12/09/news/the-pension-bureau-report-of-commissioner-
barrett.html?pagewanted=2; Internet. 
39 Glasson, 128.  
40 This paragraph draws heavily from Jensen, 207-210.  
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pensions during the Revolution (which clearly had mixed outcomes, i.e. the Philadelphia 
Mutiny of 1783), Congress established disability benefits well before ever granting 
service pensions to survivors in their old age.  
Rise of the Policy Subsystem 
The fight to pass the Arrears Act of 1879 not only exacerbated pension disparities 
and raised regional tensions it more importantly marked the rise of the veterans’ pension 
policy subsystem. This legislation held that those Civil War veterans or their survivors 
who never filed for a service or disability pension were still entitled to do so, with a 
retroactive start date at the time of the soldier’s discharge.41 In some instances, new 
applicants would be entitled to a lump sum upwards of $1000 for back pay in addition to 
monthly benefits.
42
 Pension costs to the federal government actually started a slow and 
steady decline from 1873 to 1878. But after years of strong support from organizations 
like the Grand Army of the Republic, business interests like private claim agents and 
pension attorneys, and of course, the target population of veterans’ themselves, passage 
of the Arrears Act seemed inevitable.  
Glasson speculates that mounting political pressure within State Legislatures 
before Senate reelections might have pushed some Senators to ultimately support the 
bill.
43
 He writes, “Senator Ingalls [Chairman of the Senate Pension Committee] brought 
                                                          
41 US Statutes at Large, 45th Congress, Session 3, Chapter 23, Page 265, 25 January 1879. Available from 
http://constitution.org/uslaw/sal/020_statutes_at_large.pdf; Internet. 
42 Glasson, 151. 
43 Ibid, 161. Glasson notes that Senator Ingalls was politically “attacked” by strong pension interests in his 
state with circular letters opposing his reelection. 
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the bill before the Senate and championed its passage on 16 January 1879, not long 
before balloting began in the Kansas Legislature.” The Senate went on to pass the House 
version of the bill, 44 to 4, with 28 absent. President Hays signed the bill into law on 25 
January 1879.
44
 Although a triumph for pension interests and veterans, The New York 
Times would later call the Arrears Act a “raid on the treasury.”45      
With passage of the Arrears Act, evidence of an independent and fluid veterans’ 
pension policy subsystem emerged in the 1880s as prominent policy entrepreneurs 
continued to advocate for the cause. Pension Bureau bureaucrats processed pension 
claims with an eye toward earning the Republican Party political favor. Private interests 
like veterans’ service organizations and pension claim agents frequently lobbied for 
revisions to existing pension legislation and enactment of new pension bills to maintain 
political relevance and draw members and clients to the issue. Politicians happily 
sponsored, revised, and enacted said pension legislation into law hoping to curry 
constituent votes. Interested national and local media covered the process as it unfolded. 
During this time, the only opposition to the emerging pension policy subsystem came by 
way of democrats, President Grover Cleveland especially, who opposed using pensions to 
curry political favor and redistribute wealth.   
                                                          
44 Ibid, 162-163. 
45 “Military Pensions,” The New York Times, 21 July 1921. Available from 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=FA0815FD3C551A738DDDAE0994DF405B818EF1D3; Internet. 
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Pension Committees
46
 
 The House of Representatives experienced several transitions in its pension 
committee evolution. For instance, one of the first standing committees in the House was 
the Committee on Claims, chartered in 1794. Its jurisdiction covered “all petitions and 
matters or things touching claims and demands on the United States.”47 Overwhelmed 
with Revolutionary War pensions, however, the House created a Committee on Pensions 
and Revolutionary War Claims (1813-1825), a Committee on Revolutionary Pensions 
(1825), a Committee on Military Pensions (1825-1831), and finally settling on the 
Committee on Invalid Pensions (1831-1946).
48
  
 The House Committee on Invalid Pensions was charged with reviewing individual 
Civil War pension claims and drafting general and special pension legislation.
49
 
Accordingly, the Committee on Invalid Pensions wielded a great deal of jurisdictional 
oversight of the US Pension Bureau, its executives, and was a key component to the 
policy subsystem that would arise in the wake of the Civil War. One other House 
committee of note is the Committee on Pensions (1880-1946). Created in 1880, the 
                                                          
46 The entire section draws heavily from the National Archives’ Congressional Records, specifically House 
(Record Group 233) and Senate (Record Group 46) records of the various congressional pension and claims 
committees. 
47 Committee on Claims (1794-1946), Guide to the Records of the US House of Representatives (Record 
Group 233), Chap. 6, Para. 15. Available from http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/house/chapter-06-
claims.html; Internet. 
48 See http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/house/chapter-06.html; Internet. 
49 Committee on Invalid Pensions (1831-1946), Guide to the Records of the US House of Representatives 
(Record Group 233), Chap. 6, Para. 46-47. Available from 
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/house/chapter-06-invalid-pensions.html; Internet.  
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Committee on Pensions’ jurisdiction included all other war related pension matters, 
leaving the Civil War to the Committee on Invalid Pensions. 
 The Senate Committee on Pensions (1816-1946) enjoyed primary jurisdiction and 
oversight on war related pension matters throughout its existence. While the Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs and Finance would occasionally take up pension issues, 
the Senate Committee on Pensions remained the most important for veterans’ pension 
issues in the upper chamber.
50
  
Throughout their existence, the House and Senate pension committees worked 
diligently to process individual pension claims and offer pension legislation to aid 
America’s ailing and indignant veterans. In fact, as Pension Bureau correspondence to the 
Congress increased in the 1880s, the pension committees institutionalized a review 
claims process through Friday evening “pension nights.”51 However, this diligent work 
was hardly altruistic as members of Congress often treated veterans’ pension policy as a 
partisan issue and paid little attention to details before voting to approve applications. 
Henry Glasson notes, “On ‘pension day’ there is commonly no quorum present”… as the 
                                                          
50 Committee on Claims (1816-1946), Guide to the Records of the US Senate (Record Group 46), Chap. 6, 
Para. 4. Available from http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-06.html#claims; Internet. 
Note that while the National Archives Record Group refers to the Senate Committee on “Claims,” most 
other government documentation, even records of the Committees own hearings refer to it as the 
Committee on “Pensions.”  
51 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 122. 
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few members present pass bills reported by the committee “in a perfunctory manner and 
with remarkable speed.”52  
 Congress disbanded all of the aforementioned committees in 1946 as a result of 
the Legislative Reorganization Act of the same year. While I address Congressional 
Reorganization in great detail in chapter 4, the two Congressional committees at the 
center of the veterans’ pension policy subsystem were the House Committee on Invalid 
Pensions and the Senate Committee on Pensions.          
Partisanship in the Pension Bureau 
In 1881, some sixteen years after the war between north and south had ended, 
President James Garfield appointed W.W. Dudley, a former Union colonel, to head the 
Pension Bureau. When he assumed office, Commissioner Dudley later testified that the 
Pension Bureau had between “seven hundred and eight hundred” employees. When he 
left office in 1884, the Pension Bureau had grown to “between sixteen hundred and 
seventeen hundred” employees. In fact, as of 30 June 1884, there were 1,552 pension 
employees with another 150 special examiners to be added to the rolls. This explosion in 
pension bureaucrats might simply be attributed to the growth in pension claims requiring 
adjudication and the need for special examiners to investigate such claims in the field. 
However, there is a far more political reason for such immense growth in the Pension 
Bureau – Republican Party politics.   
                                                          
52 Glasson, 277.  
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After assuming office, Dudley issued a pamphlet titled, “General Instructions to 
Special Examiners,” outlining duties for those Pension Bureau employees charged with 
investigating pension claims. The pamphlet, an 85 paragraph guide for pension agents in 
the field, covered material on claims processing, witnesses interviews, fraud, widows, 
minors, and “colored claimants, among other topics.”  
Following an introductory letter by Commissioner Dudley, the pamphlet begins 
with its purpose. It states: 
These instructions are intended to allow Special Examiners a greater discretion than has 
formerly been permitted in the examination of claims before this Office, and their duties 
call for the most vigorous efforts and soundest judgment…It is the duty of the 
Government to ascertain who are [sic] entitled to receive pensions as provided by 
existing law, and Examiners are expected and required to obtain whatever facts are 
necessary to prevent the payment of improper pensions, and to assist in bringing to 
punishment those who are knowingly guilty of violating the provisions of the pension 
law.
53
    
 
While this excerpt signals a bureaucratic intention towards fairness and equity, 
Commissioner Dudley’s implementation of his own guidance was wanting. In fact, 
Dudley used his position as commissioner to dole out and expedite pension claims to 
veterans in battleground states like Indiana to garner electoral favor for the Republican 
Party. An 1886 Democratic Party campaign book illustrates a wide ranging Republican 
Party agenda in the Pension Bureau highlighting internal documents as evidence. For 
instance, in a letter dated 9 September 1880 from Fort Wayne, IN, Colonel Richard 
Burke requests that the Commissioner of Pensions place three names on the “special list 
                                                          
53 US Pension Bureau, “General Instructions to Special Examiners of the United States Pension Office,” 
(Washington: Government Printing Office), 16 August 1881, 7.   
27 
 
[to] receive the most prompt attention of his office.”54 In a similar letter, dated 11 
September 1880, S.W. Dorsey writes the Chair of the Republican National Committee, 
Marshall Jewell, referencing Burke’s letter to the Pension Commissioner. Dorsey notes 
Burke’s letter and asks Jewell to “induce, if possible, the Commissioner of Pensions to 
report to each one of these men that their cases are made special [as] it will help us [win] 
hundreds of votes in Ft. Wayne.”55 As the Democratic National Committee notes in its 
own analysis, “us,” in this case refers to the Republican Party and its effort to garner 
votes through bureaucratic favors.  
Commissioner Dudley teamed the Pension Bureau with the Grand Army of the 
Republic, a prominent veterans’ service organization, and pension claim agents to 
politicize pensions for the Republican cause.
56
 Sure enough, politicizing the pension 
system left an enduring partisan legacy by mobilizing veterans into the Republican 
Party’s fold. To illustrate the effects of this powerful partnership, Heywood T. Sanders 
writes, “[T]he Republican Party had established, in the case of ex-soldiers, a national 
political machine – a formal organization which provided specific material inducements 
to a mass of voters.”57 Similarly, Morton Keller notes, “The Bureau of Pensions was the 
                                                          
54 Democratic National Committee, Republican Abuses in the Pension Bureau, (1886), 8. 
55 Ibid.  
56 This paragraph draws heavily from Skocpol, 122-124. 
57 Heywood T. Sanders, “Paying for the Bloody Shirt: The Politics of Civil War Pensions” in Political 
Benefits, Empirical Studies of American Public Programs, ed. Barry S. Rundquist (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1980), 138. 
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most uncompromisingly political branch of the late nineteenth century federal 
bureaucracy.”58 
Despite the realities of the Pension Bureau’s partisanship, Commissioner Dudley 
maintained a public position of objectivity. In a 6 March 1884 letter to Special Examiners 
in the field, Dudley states:  
As the time approaches when politics become the universal and often the sole topic of 
conversation, special examiners will find it more difficult than ever to obey the 
injunctions laid upon them when going out, that they should in no way participate while 
on duty…in political discussions or work, by word or act…It is hoped that each examiner 
will heed this timely warning, and to such effect that no just criticism can be laid against 
him on this ground.
59
    
   
Although he publicly reminded special examiners to remain apolitical during the 
1884 election season, Dudley again did not heed his own guidance. On 20 September 
1884, Dudley tendered his resignation as Commissioner of Pensions – effective 10 
November 1884 – to lead the Republican campaign effort in Ohio.60  From the Garfield 
Administration’s perspective, a large Pension Bureau responsive to the needs of veterans 
who vote their pocket books was a huge political asset leading up to the 1884 campaign. 
As such, Dudley’s charade of apolitical bureaucratic administration did not fool anyone, 
especially not members of Congress.   
Following his campaign stint in Ohio, Dudley returned to Washington from his 
home in Indiana throughout 1885 and testified before the Committee on Payment of 
                                                          
58 Morton Keller, Affairs of State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1977), 311. 
59 Ibid, 21. 
60 Ibid, 77. 
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Pensions, Bounty, and Back Pay on multiple occasions. In one such hearing on 25 
February 1885, the New York Times reported:  
[The] Witness’s attention was called to the allegation that claims from Ohio and Indiana 
had been pushed ahead of those of other states for political reasons. In reply, 
[Commissioner Dudley]…declared that no class or section had been unduly favored by 
his order or with his knowledge, and that had any favoritism been shown by any 
subordinate the man would have lost his place.
61
  
 
Later that year on 26 November 1885, the Committee Chairman, AJ Warner of 
Marietta, Ohio, further pressed Commissioner Dudley on his political influence in the 
Pension Bureau. 
CHAIRMAN WARNER: [Y]ou would doubtless admit (I know you would) that if a man 
has a right to a pension, it is because of disabilities incurred in the service and not 
because of politics? 
COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: I shall agree with you fully on that proposition.  
CHAIRMAN WARNER: And that politics ought not to enter into the question of a 
settlement of claims? 
COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: They certainly ought not. 
CHAIRMAN WARNER: Would you not think it quite as objectionable and as grave an 
offense for a man holding a judicial position [such as yourself] to allow politics to affect 
cases, as for a judge on the bench to let it be known, or have it understood, that the 
political opinions of a man would affect his rights in court? 
COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: Yes, and if anything more so.  
CHAIRMAN WARNER: You have spoken about an order which you issued forbidding 
special examiners to engage in politics.  
COMMISSINER DUDLEY: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN WARNER: When you left the office as Commissioner of Pensions, where 
did you leave it to go? 
                                                          
61 “Mr. Dudley and Pension Office Abuses,” The New York Times, 26 February 1885. 
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COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: To go on leave of absence. 
CHAIRMAN WARNER: Where? 
COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: I went to Ohio.  
CHAIRMAN WARNER: What to do? 
COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: I went there for the purpose of assisting my party. 
CHAIRMAN WARNER: You went there to conduct a political campaign? 
COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: I do not assume that I conducted it. I went to render such 
assistance as I could. 
CHAIRMAN WARNER: Did you not virtually take charge of the campaign under the 
direction of the Republican central committee of the State? 
COMMISSIONER DUDLEY: That is a matter personal to myself. I do not regard it as a 
proper subject of inquiry for this committee. I regard it as a matter personal to myself, 
and not a matter subject to be inquired into by the committee; and I decline to answer the 
question. I state, very frankly, that I went there and did what I could to help my party.
62
 
 
This contentious exchange between the committee chairman and witness 
highlights an emerging policy subsystem at work. The members of Congress, clearly 
prepared with information beforehand, knew the answers to their questions ahead of time 
and pushed Commissioner Dudley for the truth about his undue political influence on the 
claims process. By doing so, Congress asserted its legislative oversight functions of an 
executive agency by holding its leaders accountable, on occasion even earning public 
attention from the most prominent newspaper in the country on matters of veterans’ 
pension policy. Preparation, information, oversight, and accountability proved to be key 
facets of the committee hearing venue by the mid-1880s.   
                                                          
62 Testimony Taken by the Committee on Payment of Pensions, Bounty, and Back Pay Relating to the 
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Pension Attorneys, Claim Agents, and the Grand Army of the Republic   
Pension attorneys and professional claim agents used pension legislation, 
especially the new Arrears Act of 1879, to grow their businesses and build wealth by 
advertising their services in newspapers, journals, and magazines to raise awareness and 
attract eligible clients throughout the 1880s.
63
 This proliferation of private business 
interest in military pension policy, in part, facilitated the enormous growth of applications 
to the Pension Bureau and cost to the taxpayers.  
One such private interest pamphlet was titled, A Manual of Instructions for the 
Preparation of Government Claims for Bounty and Back Pay, Pensions, Prize Money, 
Navy Pay, and for Horses Lost in Battle. In it, claims attorneys Gardner and Burgess 
publish a guide for pension claim agents and veterans, describing applicable laws on the 
books as of 1864. The manual outlines order and eligibility for pension entitlement 
(soldier, widow, children, mother, and sister) and rules for presenting evidence of 
disability, dependence, and or loss of property during military service (including horses 
under an 1849 law). Finally, the pamphlet even includes pre-filled application forms and 
example statements of dependence to help applicants as much as possible. The bottom of 
one form even states:  
Please remit or deliver the Certificate or Warrant payable on and under my Claim for 
value… herewith attached, to my duly authorized Attorneys, Gardner & Burgess, of 
Washington City, D.C., (sic) who are fully authorized by me to receive and conduct all 
correspondence in the claim and to receive and receipt the Certificate when issued.
64
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With just a simple form, veterans and dependents could easily apply for a pension 
claim while simultaneously becoming clients of Gardner & Burgess, without so much as 
ever meeting these attorneys at law. These simple pamphlets helped veterans understand 
the application process and allowed them to send and receive information regarding their 
pension claims to the Pension Bureau, through their attorneys or claim agents. The 
information processing role that these private interests played was vital in helping 
veterans navigate a cumbersome and often politically motivated bureaucracy.  
For veterans, employing a pension attorney or claim agent did not come without 
the risk of exploitation. According to disability scholars Blanck and Song, “Never before 
in American History had advocates been involved in activities of such grand and social 
and political scale, in efforts to help veterans pursue monetary gain, public acceptance 
and recognition.”65 Veterans’ pension policy clearly holds the key to understanding the 
beginnings of the sophisticated policy subsystem. As such, there is evidence that 
unscrupulous claim agents and pension attorneys looked for ways to profit from the 
pension system at the expense of their veteran clients. Historian Herbert Agar writes, “As 
a result [of generous Union pensions], claim agents traveled the country looking for ex-
                                                                                                                                                                             
Brothers Printers, 1864), 27. This paragraph draws from the 32 page pamphlet to highlight its simplicity 
and easy use for veterans and their dependents. The authors write in the introduction, “It was our intention 
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65 Peter Blanck and Chen Song, “Civil War Pension Attorneys and Disability Politics,” University of 
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soldiers who had something the matter with them and persuading them to blame it on the 
war.”66  
As authorized under the Pension Act of 1862, pension attorneys and claim agents 
earned a fixed $5 fee for every application filed on a veteran’s behalf with an extra $1.50 
for any necessary sworn statements testifying to the veteran’s disabilities.67 “As a result,” 
Blanck and Song assert, “the more soldiers who applied for pensions, the greater the 
attorneys’ profits, since it was a volume business. For obvious reasons, pension attorneys 
tried to enlarge their claimant pool…and lobbied aggressively in Washington for the 
expansion of the pension system.”68 Blanck and Song further conclude, “For the first time 
in American history, the Civil War pension system also created an ongoing relationship 
among the federal government, individual veterans, and their advocates and lobbying 
organizations that represented their interests.”69 
Beyond the private interests of claim agents and pension attorneys, powerful 
soldier advocacy groups like the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) actively lobbied the 
Congress on behalf of the veterans’ community. On 8 March 1884, the Senate Committee 
on Pensions heard testimony from representatives of the GAR who claimed to represent 
some 220,000 veteran soldiers and sailors of the Civil War.
70
 In fact, the GAR formed its 
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own Committee on Pensions to mirror the committee in the US Senate. GAR 
representative, General Louis Wagner said, “…Grand Army has continued its pension 
committee as a breakwater between Congress and those [veterans] who demanded 
pensions.”71 This organizational innovation gave Senators direct counterparts, effectively 
raising the political clout of the GAR and signaling that in order for the Congress to 
revise or consider new pension policies, the Senate Committee on Pensions could only 
proceed with the concurrence of its GAR counterpart.  
Senators and GAR representatives used this 1884 committee hearing and its 
question and answer period as an opportunity to exchange information, signal policy 
preferences, raise concerns, and clarify positions. General George S. Merrill, representing 
the GAR, followed the Chairman with a prepared opening statement and a litany of GAR 
policy positions. It reads:  
We desire to give whatever weight we may have as a body or as individuals in favor of 
such measures as we deem just, which may now or hereafter be before you. We likewise 
desire to protest against and condemn certain propositions, which are now on your files, 
ostensibly in the interest of the old soldier or sailor, but which seem to us to be 
inconsiderate, impolitic, and calculated to bring into disrepute the general standing of the 
saviors of the nation.
72
  
 
 Senators and witnesses discussed everything from rank based pension eligibility 
to fraudulent claims. Without robust congressional staffs to assist members with 
preparation, committee hearings served as a most powerful venue for effective and 
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efficient information processing and exchange. Aside from brief prepared statements 
from the committee chairman and GAR representatives, the most substantive information 
exchanges occurred during the candid question and answer period.  
During this unscripted series of back and forth exchanges, GAR laid the 
groundwork for what would become most extensive expansion of military pension policy 
in American history – the Dependent Pension Act of 1890. Arguing in favor of pensions 
for widows, General Merrill states:  
In regard to the continuance of a soldier’s pension to his widow…if a soldier having a 
pension today for a cause, is killed in a railroad accident, or dies from any cause not 
directly traceable to the disability which gives him the pension, then his pension is wiped 
out, and the widow gets no pension. That seems to us to be very unjust.
73
 
 
The question of pension expansion to poor widows soon led to the following exchange 
between General Merrill and Senator Henry Blair of New Hampshire. 
MR. BLAIR: If a man who rendered service in any war, and there is no war later than 
that of the rebellion, is actually disabled, or pecuniarily dependent [sic] –    
GENERAL MERRILL: I would leave out the dependent part in all bills. I do not like the 
idea of making paupers of our soldiers.  
MR. BLAIR: But you do make paupers of the mothers. I do not like the idea that poverty 
is dishonorable, whether it is on the pension list or elsewhere.  
GENERAL MERRILL: [A] mother who at the time of the death of her son was in 
comfortable circumstances, and therefore not entitled to a pension, may be the reverses of 
business or fortune have become a candidate for the almshouse. Yet she cannot get today 
a pension because she was not dependent upon the son at the time of the son’s death. We 
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think that is wrong, and that if she became dependent since, that at the time and during 
the continuance of the dependence a pension should be granted.
74
   
 
GAR used the committee hearing venue to explicitly recommend particular 
policies, including dependent pensions, for the Senate Committee to consider. GAR 
clearly signaled its policy preferences and made no qualms about continued pension 
expansion. In a dynamic policy subsystem, ideas and information that permeate and flow 
from one institution to another provide the necessary frame of reference for future 
legislation. Whether GAR believed the political mood in Washington was ready for 
pension expansion in 1884 is unclear. However, what is clear is that GAR representatives 
believed in their mission to represent veterans and would use information and anecdotes 
to frame their arguments for new pension policies.      
The GAR’s Committee on Pensions pursued pension expansion again two years 
later. On 19 January 1886, the Senate Committee on Pensions held another hearing for 
GAR to present its position. In his opening statement before the comittee, General Merrill 
asserts, “We come to you today with precisely the same recommendations without 
change, except in the form in which they are here given, as we presented to your 
committee two years ago.”75 He further claims GAR membership had grown to some 
300,000 veterans and that the organization’s Committee on Pensions was the designated 
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“mouth-piece” for its members “in all matters of pension legislation.”76 In a circular 
presented to the Senate committee, GAR once again laid out its policy preferences in 
terms of pension expansion to widows, minor children, and mothers under various 
circumstances of a veteran’s death. Additionally, GAR recommended specific dollar 
amounts for pensions to disabled veterans. For instance, GAR recommended $100 a 
month “for men who lost both eyes, or arms, or legs, or an arm and a leg, or disability 
equivalent thereto.”77 By recommending specific pension awards for varying degrees of 
disability, the GAR Committee on Pensions signaled its close study and intimate 
understanding of the challenges facing disabled veterans as they attempted to make a 
living and support their families.  
General Merrill also asserted GAR’s universalism as “the only great organization 
that represents everybody, that has no possible connections with political questions, and 
takes in all parties and all organizations.”78 As such, GAR again advocated pension 
expansion to widows whose husbands died from disease or causes unrelated to wartime 
disabilities and the parents of veterans who became impoverished since their son’s death. 
What is more, General Merrill highlights GARs rather liberal perspective on pension 
eligibility and lackluster fraud prevention stating, “If 100 men are standing in line and 5 
of them are not really entitled, I would say give it to the 5 rather than denying the 95 who 
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are deserving.”79 This statement, as bold as it was, elicited no response from the Senate 
committee, signaling to GAR its countenance of such a liberal practice. 
Presidents, Politics, and Pensions 
In 1881, former union general and rising republican star, Benjamin Harrison, was 
elected to the US Senate by the Indiana State Legislature. As a colonel in General 
Sherman’s army, Harrison commanded a brigade during the Atlanta campaign. He 
garnered significant praise from his superiors for displaying valor at the battle of 
Peachtree Creek in 1864.
80
 And in 1865, just months before leaving the service for 
Indiana, Harrison earned his final promotion to brigadier general, solidifying his 
reputation as a warrior, patriot, and leader. Not surprisingly, Senator Harrison was a 
champion of Civil War service pensions. Senator Harrison’s position and consistent 
advocacy for generous pension benefits was in stark contrast to the democrat occupying 
the Oval Office from 1885 to 1889 – President Grover Cleveland. 
In his first term, President Cleveland was ever suspicious of growing pension rolls 
and frustrated with the Congress that happily contributed to the pension bloat. Speaking 
to this point, historian Herbert Agar writes, “By 1885, 325,000 pensioners were on the 
roll. The pension authorities were lax and the list was growing rapidly; but the authorities 
were not lax enough to satisfy the more sentimental or the more vote-hungry 
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Congressmen.”81 Recall that in 1884 and in 1886, respectively, as outlined in the previous 
section, the Senate Committee on Pensions heard testimony from the GAR favoring a 
broad expansion of pension benefits to relatives of Union veterans. As an old soldier 
himself and ally of the GAR,
82
 Senator Henry Blair of New Hampshire pushed the “Blair 
bill” through Congress. House Bill 10457, as it was officially known, was titled, “An act 
for the relief of dependent parents and honorably discharged soldiers and sailors who are 
now disabled and dependent upon their own labor for support.” The bill called for anyone 
(including surviving parents) with three months of honorable service to the Union during 
the war – whether engaged in combat or not – to be awarded a pension for “any form of 
disability, no matter how or when acquired, including the disability of old age.”83 
Needless to say, President Cleveland opposed the legislation.  
 On 11 February 1887, President Cleveland vetoed the Blair bill, contributing to 
his long list of first term vetoes numbering in the hundreds. In his 4,193 word veto 
message to Congress, Cleveland cites growing pension statistics, the nation’s prior 
experience with military pensions, and points to historical trends which grant old age 
pensions to veterans nearly four decades after war, not a mere 22 years as the Blair bill 
would do. Moreover, President Cleveland also frames his veto in terms of a public tax 
burden and federal revenue. He writes:     
                                                          
81 Agar, 582. 
82 Agar notes that Blair was a “Republican Senator with a gallant war record [who] claimed that every 
union soldier should be pensioned, [because] every soldier came out of the war weaker than he went into 
it.” 
83 Ibid, 582-583. 
40 
 
Under [Civil War pension] statutes 561,571 pensions have been granted from the year 
1861 to June 30, 1886, and more than 2,600 pensioners have been added to the rolls by 
private acts passed to meet cases, many of them of questionable merit, which the general 
laws did not cover…If this bill should become a law, with its tremendous addition to our 
pension obligation, I am thoroughly convinced that further efforts to reduce the Federal 
revenue and restore some part of it to our people will, and perhaps should, be seriously 
questioned…I am not willing to approve a measure presenting the objections to which 
this bill is subject, and which, moreover, will have the effect of disappointing the 
expectation of the people and their desire and hope for relief from war taxation in time of 
peace.
84
 
 
Aside from the tax burden, the reality of party politics throughout this period 
suggests Cleveland had little to gain, politically, by backing pension legislation. 
Cleveland only won the election of 1884 by carrying his home state of New York by 
1,149 votes.
85
 Ardently opposed to party patronage, Cleveland ran for the White House 
on an anti-corruption platform and at the time, the Pension Bureau and pension system 
were bastions of political corruption and patronage. As president, Cleveland vetoed some 
three hundred individual pension bills and earned himself the ire of Civil War veterans, 
most especially the Grand Army of the Republic.
86
 This undoubtedly contributed to his 
election downfall in 1888.      
With several pension vetoes contributing to the political context, most especially 
Cleveland’s 1887 veto, Benjamin Harrison found himself seeking the Republican Party’s 
nomination for President just seven years after his election to the US Senate. The 
following excerpt from the 1888 Republican Party platform summarizes the argument in 
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favor of veterans’ pensions, framed within the context of a budget surplus, giving the 
Republicans, ever wishing to be the favorite for veterans, a clear advantage over the 
Democrats and President Cleveland. 
The gratitude of the Nation to the defenders of the Union cannot be measured by laws. 
The legislation of Congress should conform to the pledges made by a loyal people and be 
so enlarged and extended as to provide against the possibility that any man who 
honorably wore the Federal uniform shall become the inmate of an almshouse, or 
dependent upon private charity. In the presence of an overflowing treasury it would be a 
public scandal to do less for those whose valorous service preserved the government. We 
denounce the hostile spirit shown by President Cleveland in his numerous vetoes of 
measures for pension relief, and the action of the Democratic House of Representatives in 
refusing even a consideration of general pension legislation.
87
  
 
In September 1888, Harrison accepted the Republican nomination for the 
presidency. In his letter to the committee, he responded most favorably to the party’s 
position, framing veterans’ pensions as an expression of gratitude for their faithful and 
unselfish service. He writes: 
 
It can hardly be necessary for me to say that I am heartily in sympathy with the 
declaration of the convention upon the subject of pensions to our soldiers and sailors. 
What they gave and what they suffered I had some opportunity to observe, and, in a small 
measure, to experience. They gave ungrudgingly; it was not a trade, but an offering. The 
measure was heaped up, running over. What they achieved only a distant generation can 
adequately tell. Without attempting to discuss particular propositions, I may add that 
measures in behalf of the surviving veterans of the war and of the families of their dead 
comrades should be conceived and executed in a spirit of justice and of the most grateful 
liberality…88 
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As he signals above, Harrison’s presidency would bring about continued spending 
measures favorable to the veterans’ cause, thereby exacerbating sectionalism and 
ushering in the era of the “Billion Dollar Congress” in 1890.  
Sectionalism and the Tariff 
Tariff receipts of the 1880s created a significant budget surplus, as implied by the 
Republican Party platform reference to the “outflowing treasury.” Accordingly, Morton 
Keller notes that the “most pressing fiscal problem of the 1880s was the large revenue 
surplus generated by rising tariff receipts.”89 As Democrats saw it, tariffs placed an undue 
tax burden on the south and west. Republicans, on the other hand, viewed tariffs, and the 
redistributive social policies that they facilitated, as the glue that held the party’s electoral 
coalitions together. As such, the Pension Bureau “reopened old cases, rerated existing 
pensions upward, and generally rewarded political allies and supporters” during the 
Harrison presidency to meet political ends.
90
 Political scientist Richard Bensel argues:  
Because pension recipients allied themselves with the core industrial elite and thus 
formed a coalition large enough to successfully defend a high tariff as a part of the 
national political economy, the redistribution of this tariff revenue through the Civil War 
pension system became a major element in the political strategy of development.
91
  
 
 
Moreover, the Union only policy that persisted well beyond the close of the Civil 
War left few current southern residents eligible for pension benefits. Regional tensions 
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grew from the reality that the south was still being largely punished for waging war 
against the north. Historian Walter Prescott Webb estimated that some seven billion 
dollars in pension benefits went to residents in the north while only one billion went to 
residents in the south and west.
92
 This lopsided redistribution of wealth and the remaining 
budget surplus led Democrats to favor cutting tariffs by lowering foreign trade barriers 
while Republicans preferred to maintain tariffs and simply increase federal spending.
93
 
Northern Republicans and southern Democrats alike knew that any expansion of Civil 
War pensions would largely favor the northeast and mid-west, excluding the democratic 
south and leaving it farther and farther behind. As a democrat, this no doubt contributed 
to President Cleveland’s 1887 Blair bill veto.94  
Watchdog Media and Growing Public Concern 
After winning the 1888 presidential election largely by linking tariffs to veterans, 
the “soldier-president” Benjamin Harrison moved to consolidate his victory by placing 
service-pensions at the top of his political agenda. The importance of the policy 
subsystem is also apparent in President Harrison’s second Pension Commissioner, former 
Illinois Congressman and IRS commissioner, Green B. Raum. Following the short and 
disastrous tenure of his first pension commissioner, The Nation magazine declared that 
the “nominal executive,” President Harrison, “does not dare appoint any man…before he 
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has procured the endorsement of Gen. R.A. Alger, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand 
Army of the Republic…The situation is without precedent.”95 Media involvement in 
policy matters is a staple of the policy subsystem. Following Raum’s appointment (with 
GAR support), both republican and democratic print journals praised the new 
commissioner for his executive leadership, Civil War service, and objectivity.
96
 Despite 
the initial accolades, Raum proved to be as liberal in his favorable interpretation of 
pension laws for applicants as his predecessor.
97
 
In addition to media attention, veterans’ pension policy pervaded the public 
debate during this period. On 1 June 1890, Edward H. Hall preached a sermon at the First 
Parish Church in Cambridge, MA, titled, “An Indignity to Our Citizen Soldiers.” Hall, 
with a passionate and informed rhetoric, recounts the history of Civil War pension policy 
for his parishioners, detailing the initial enthusiasm to care for the new generation of 
veterans, the number of pension claims filed since 1861, and the dollar amount dispersed 
from the treasury as a result. He also discusses the growth of private interest surrounding 
veterans’ pensions and its corrupting effect. He states: 
 
But, unfortunately, it was not the soldiers along who thought themselves concerned in the 
matter. The making out of so many thousand claims and the expenditure of so many 
millions of dollars proved so lucrative a business, and the possibility of extending these 
claims in various directions proved so strong a temptation, that a great and thriving trade 
sprang up, based upon the soldier’s needs. Plenty of honest men there were, no doubt, 
among these pension agents, but outside this lesser circle was formed a far larger ring, 
whose sole thought was to awaken discontent among the recipients of pensions and bring 
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to bear upon Congress a pressure, apparently for the people themselves, for an increase of 
the nation’s liberal gratuities. The country was flooded with circulars and appeals, 
military societies were led on step by step to countenance these friendly efforts in their 
behalf, public sentiment was quietly and successfully played upon to sympathize with the 
soldier’s sufferings and to forget that anything had yet been done to relieve him, 
politicians were reminded of the rich party capital to be secured by coming forward as the 
soldier’s friends, – until an entirely new era of pension legislation, unknown to the period 
of war itself, began.
98
 
 
Hall describes the private advocacy campaign to garner Congressional interest in 
raising pension benefits for Civil War veterans with disdain, especially when describing 
how “public sentiment was quietly and successfully played upon” with “circulars and 
appeals” like the one published by attorneys Burgess and Gardner in 1864.  
In his sermon, Hall also mentions a “new era of pension legislation,” referencing 
the Arrears Act of 1879. In his effort to inform the public, Hall continues by describing 
the Dependent Pension Act of 1890 being debated in the Congress that spring. Hall 
argues: 
[W]e find ourselves in the extraordinary and even grotesque position to-day of paying, in 
pensions to our former soldiers, more than any European nation pays for its standing 
army, and yet at this moment, two bills are passing back and forth between the United 
States Senate and House, which, if adopted, will add 200,000 or 380,000 new names to 
the pension roll, and increase the annual expenditure by $40,000,000 to $80,000,000, or 
if certain pending amendments are adopted, by $470,000,000.
99
     
 
The $40-$80 million range of annual estimates Hall first mentions were in line 
with the $50,000,000 initial estimate for arrears legislation furnished by Dudley’s 
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predecessor at the Pension Bureau, J.A. Bentley.
100
 Passage of new legislation in 1890 
undoubtedly inspired a sense of excess spending among Americans, as Hall alludes to a 
$470 million bill “if certain pending amendments are adopted.” Defying initial estimates, 
spending on arrears pensions alone had ballooned to $118 million in 1891 and to nearly 
$140 million by the end of the decade.
101
    
Fulfilling his campaign promises and ensuring that his administration was “liberal 
with the boys,”102 veterans’ pensions exploded under the Harrison presidency and the 
“Billion-Dollar Congress” of 1889-1991, just as Hall predicted. This is mostly due to 
loose interpretation of laws already on the books and enactment of the Dependent 
Pension Act of 1890, which passed the senate with 31 Republicans and three Democrats 
in favor over 18 Democrats in opposition.
103
 This new legislation relaxed eligibility 
restrictions more than any pension policy had before. It reads: 
That all persons who served ninety days or more in the military or naval service of the 
United States during the late war of Rebellion and who have been honorably discharged 
therefrom, and who are now or who may hereafter be suffering from a mental or physical 
disability of a permanent character, not the result of their own vicious habits, which 
incapacitates them from the performance of manual labor.
104
 
 
Despite efforts like Hall’s to inform the public of the tremendous private sector 
corruption and likely costs to be incurred by enacting new pension legislation, the 
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Dependent Pension Act of 1890 passed the Congress. In his second State of the Union 
address on 1 December 1890, President Harrison acknowledged enactment of the new 
legislation earlier that year. He stated, “There is no economy to the Government in delay, 
while there is much hardship and injustice to the soldier. The anticipated expenditure, 
while very large, will not, it is believed, be in excess of the estimates made before the 
enactment of the law.”105 In his reference to “hardship and injustice,” Harrison leveraged 
images of these veterans as deserving better than that, for they had already borne a 
lifetime of hardship and injustice in many cases. The soldier-president stood by the 
expanded pension benefits, as he promised, framing the policy in a moral-ethical light to 
protect the old soldiers from becoming paupers. Harrison, long the Republican champion 
of veterans’ pensions, was wrong about their low costs, however. He lost his re-election 
bid in 1892 to his predecessor in the White House, democrat Grover Cleveland. Never 
before and never since has an incumbent president lost re-election to his predecessor.   
After the act of 1890 was codified into law, pension liabilities ballooned between 
1891 and 1900, budget surpluses fell, and by 1893 an astounding 41.5 percent of federal 
income went to veterans’ benefits.106 Spending 41.5 percent of federal income on pension 
spending is absurd, especially considering as Bernard Rostker notes, “The Civil War 
Pension was…one that not all Americans shared equally.”107 Rostker is pointing to the 
                                                          
105 Benjamin Harrison, “Second Annual Message,” 1 December 1890, The American Presidency Project, 
UCSB; Available from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29531; Internet. 
106 Bernard Rostker, Providing for the Casualties of War: The American Experience Through World War 
II, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 261.  
107 Ibid. 
48 
 
reality that veterans of the confederacy were cut out of this government largess and as a 
result, so too was the entire south. As such, southern states were left to their own devices.  
Confederate Pensions 
 Federal Civil War pensions were for Union veterans only. The 1862 Pension Act 
clearly outlined this provision allocating benefits to veterans “disabled by reason of 
wounds received or disease contracted while in the service of the United States (emphasis 
added), and in the line of duty…”108 The same law further outlined that “No moneys shall 
be paid to [those] who have in anyway been engaged or who have aided or abetted the 
existing rebellion in the United States.”109  
Without Union consideration for Confederate veterans in the aftermath of the war, 
southern states were left to enact and implement pension policies on their own. The 
notion of policy diffusion from the federal government to state governments has 
theoretical grounding in recent scholarly research. Political scientist Graeme Boushey 
argues:  
[V]ariation in the speed of innovation diffusion should be understood as resulting from 
the disproportionate allocation of political attention in the United States. In the majority 
of cases, diffusion occurs through the gradual formulation and adjustment of policy 
across state legislatures. At other times, state policymakers are faced with growing public 
demands to pass an emerging “fad” policy implemented in neighboring states. Often, new 
policy problems are revealed by exogenous shocks or new policy solutions are demanded 
by the federal government. These distinct pressures systematically lead to very different 
temporal patterns of diffusion.
110
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No doubt that political attention in the United States was disproportionality 
allocated to the Union in the midst of and following the Civil War. Furthermore, state 
legislatures across the Confederacy, as Theda Skocpol has documented, took up various 
pension measures during and after the war.
111
 Finally, the “War Between the States” led 
to a flood of disabled Confederate veterans returning home without the means to support 
themselves or their families. Few would argue that such a scenario was not an 
“exogenous shock” to the local, state, and regional economies, leaving southern 
policymakers to rely on disability and service pensions as the only viable options to 
address the problem.     
Virginia, home of the Confederate capitol, offers a window through which to view 
state pension policies in the Confederacy as the commonwealth has a well-documented 
history of its veterans’ pension policies. The first such pension policy, administered 
through the county court system, came in 1863, titled, “An Act for Relief of Indignant 
Soldiers and Sailors.” According to Mark E. Rodgers, a social work scholar, “The act 
offered benefits (money and in-kind services) to Virginia servicemen who had been 
disabled in the military or who had died in military service, as well as to the indigent 
families of those who were currently in military service.” Amended in 1864 to include 
those families driven from their homes because of the war, “localities could raise funds to 
aid needy servicemen and their loved ones.”112 Without a federal backbone to subsidize 
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the cost of these pensions and pay the human toll of war, states like Virginia were left to 
rely upon counties, municipalities, and generous citizens to provide for Confederate 
veterans and their families. Rodgers cites an 1885 pamphlet from the Confederate Relief 
Bazaar Association which states, “[Confederate soldiers’ and sailors’] only protection 
from the almshouse is such assistance as the large hearted and openhanded people…will 
extend to them.”113 
 Moving forward to the late 1880s, more than 20 years after the end of the war, 
organizations realized philanthropy like that encouraged by the Confederate Relief 
Bazaar Association was not enough as “the need among veterans was too great for 
different voluntary societies to handle.”114 As Virginia beefed up its statutory support for 
disabled confederate veterans, an 1887 law established eligibility guidelines for pension 
claimants. These requirements included: (1) Virginia residency at the time of application, 
(2) Virginia residency during the war, (3) military service in the Confederacy, (4) 
dependence on physical labor for livelihood, (5) disability resulting from loss of limb, 
eyesight, or surgery, and (6) no receipt of an artificial limb, eye, or related payment 
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within the previous five years.
115
 Just like the Union, southern states looked to protect 
themselves from fraudulent claims and undeserving recipients. 
 As President Cleveland vetoed the Blair bill in 1887, Virginia considered its own 
generous pension act further providing for disabled service members and confederate 
widows. In March 1888, Virginia passed the Confederate Pension Act. Rodgers notes that 
this new law was more of an incremental policy change rather than a comprehensive 
one.
116
 Most notable, however, was the provision for confederate widows, codifying 
support for indignant families into Virginia law. While Rodgers’ book on Virginia 
pensions is the most comprehensive work on the commonwealth’s system to date, he 
gives no indication as to whether Virginia lawmakers were looking north to Washington, 
DC for federal pension policy ideas. However, one might infer that as the late 1880s 
witnessed a pervasive national debate about Union pensions during the Cleveland and 
Harrison administrations, Virginia lawmakers were undoubtedly aware of all the benefits 
their constituents were ineligible for and enacted their own legislation to compensate.  
In addition to Virginia, more recent work on Civil War pensions in the 
confederate south illustrates programs in Texas and Georgia. Mary Wilson asserts that 
state legislators in Texas, already burdened by veterans of its own war for independence, 
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were reluctant to award pensions to veterans of the Confederacy. Moreover, a provision 
in Texas’s 1876 constitution implicitly “forbade granting of public monies to any 
individual except in cases of public calamity.” Consequently, legislators turned to public 
land grants and a controversial home building program to compensate. Years of public 
pleas to assist veterans led to an eventual shift in popular opinion. In 1898, Texas voters 
approved a constitutional amendment reversing the public monies restriction. In 1899, the 
state legislature passed a pension measure that would last over sixty years.
117
 
 Unlike Texas, Georgia suffered widespread devastation from the war. Yet, state 
legislators were compelled to provide for their veterans. Early postwar measures provided 
foodstuffs for families and prostheses for veterans missing limbs. In 1885, the legislature 
and voters alike passed a constitutional amendment to clear the way for further pension 
measures. During the legislative session of 1886-1887, lawmakers passed a stipend for 
disabled confederate veterans. In 1890, Georgia enacted a pension law providing for 
Confederate widows living in Georgia. In 1894, a measure to provide pensions to 
indigent veterans passed the legislature. This spirit of Georgian generosity continued into 
the twentieth century.
118
 
 The Confederate experience with Civil War pensions highlights the disparities 
across the south in providing aid to disabled and indigent veterans and their families. 
Clearly, local efforts to impact the plight of veterans proved inadequate. Moreover, each 
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state differed in its approach to the pension question. When comparing the Union pension 
experience to the Confederate pension experience, one is left with the sense that federal 
involvement in the matter made all the difference. While this could be a simple matter of 
resource availability, there is something to be said for the success and efficacy of a 
unified approach across government for the disabled and indigent.    
Summary 
The long list of scholars who have explored Civil War pensions in previous works 
all highlighted some important aspect of pension policy and political development. 
However, no scholar has attempted to examine veterans’ pension policy through the lens 
of a policy subsystem. This chapter does just that. Clearly, the historical record and 
existing scholarship indicate that a dynamic veterans’ pension policy subsystem emerged 
in the wake of the Civil War. As such, I must accept subsystem formation hypothesis.  
First, congressional committees of jurisdiction on Civil War pensions evolved 
over the years and effectively wielded power over this policy domain. Second, the 
Pension Bureau dedicated itself to delivering veterans’ pensions in the name of political 
patronage and partisan politics. Third, private interests of dubious scruple, such as 
pension attorneys and claim agents, actively lobbied Congress for new pension legislation 
and solicited veterans for their business. Fourth, powerful veterans’ service organizations 
like the Grand Army of the Republic rallied veterans and families in the name of sacrifice 
and became a force for Congress to reckon with. Next, unflattering and consistent media 
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coverage of the pension system contributed to a national conversation on the merits of 
veterans’ pension policy. Finally, several US Presidents – the most elite policy 
entrepreneurs – weighed into pension politics at various points in the late nineteenth 
century attempting to break into subsystem policymaking. 
When taken together and viewed through the lens of a dynamic policy subsystem, 
the confluence of these factors clearly indicates the existence of a dynamic veterans’ 
pension policy subsystem. Despite the best efforts of elite policy entrepreneurs like 
Grover Cleveland and Benjamin Harrison, a powerful subsystem undoubtedly controlled 
nineteenth century veterans’ pension policy well into the twentieth century. This 
subsystem control would leave a lasting mark on future veterans’ pension policy debates 
through the Great War and beyond.  
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CHAPTER 3: WORLD WAR I AND SUBSYSTEM EVOLUTION 
 The post-Civil War period saw the emergence and subsequent growth of the 
veterans’ pension policy subsystem. No doubt, a powerful subsystem persisted well 
beyond the end of the nineteenth century and maintained a coherent policy focus on 
veterans’ benefits.119 This coherent focus does not necessarily imply rigidity or 
intractability. On the contrary, political scientist Jeffrey Worsham contends that policy 
subsystems are capable of both maintaining policy coherence and withstanding 
punctuations in the policymaking environment – focusing events, new information, and 
additional actors or institutions.
120
 Resilient subsystems are able to adapt and transform 
over time, proving to be the most difficult for political adversaries to breakdown and 
overcome.     
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the policy subsystem’s resilience, 
adaptability, and transformation through World War I and beyond. In short, I argue that 
interest group lifecycles and bureaucratic consolidation transformed the landscape of the 
chaotic veterans’ subsystem and pushed it one step closer toward subsystem efficiency. I 
operationalize this argument by testing interest group lifecycle hypothesis and 
bureaucratic consolidation hypothesis: first, veterans’ interest groups emerge in the wake 
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of conflict, thrive in the policymaking process for a period of time, and fade away as a 
generation of veterans passes on and a new generation emerges; second, bureaucratic 
consolidation during the interwar period raised the visibility of veterans’ policy within 
government and professionalized and streamlined the delivery of veterans’ services.    
The chapter breaks down into six sections. First, I provide brief historical context 
for War Risk Insurance leading into World War I. Second, I explore the emergence of 
powerful new veterans’ organizations like the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign 
Wars (VFW). Third, I discuss the executive-legislative bonus battles that characterized 
the fight for veterans’ benefits post-World War I. Fourth, I discuss bureaucratic 
consolidation and the transformation that paved the way for the efficient policy 
subsystem. I also touch on the World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 and the 
(already well documented) political mobilization of the Bonus Expeditionary Force in 
this section. Next, I explore the Veterans’ Bureau’s transition to the Veterans’ 
Administration. Finally, I conclude the chapter with the National Defense Efficiency Act 
of 1935 that foreshadows the split between the veterans’ policy and military personnel 
policy subsystems. 
The Doughboys Sign-up for War Risk Insurance 
The United States officially entered World War I on 6 April 1917 with a formal 
declaration of war. Six months later, Congress passed the War Risk Insurance Act 
(WRIA) on 6 October 1917 and set in motion a series of events that would define 
veterans’ pension policy for the progressive era. The legacy of corruption, partisanship, 
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and financial largess that characterized the various Civil War pension acts and the 
existing veterans’ pension system was politically unpalatable to many Washington 
lawmakers. While the pension committees in Congress aimed to retain control of their 
policy monopoly by placing new beneficiaries under the purview of the existing system 
administered by the Pension Bureau, the chairmen of the House Commerce and Senate 
Finance Committees sought to redefine the issue by altering committee jurisdictions.
121
 
Reformers “wanted to exclude the Pension Bureau because they viewed it as 
irredeemably linked to the excessive, corrupt, and irrational Civil War system.”122    
The calls for reform in Congress created a window of opportunity for policy 
entrepreneurs in the Wilson Administration to exploit. On 31 July 1917, Treasury 
Secretary William G. McAdoo sent a letter to President Wilson sharing plans for 
comprehensive benefits legislation, the WRIA. In his letter, McAdoo presents a 
hypothetical scenario in which a quadruple amputee would receive a flat $100 per month 
under the existing pension system regardless of family size or necessary medical care. 
Under the proposed plan, however, that same soldier could receive up to $105 per month 
should he meet certain family and medical conditions.
123
 McAdoo contends: 
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Everyman should know that the moment he in enlisted in the military service of the 
Government, these definite guarantees and assurances are given to him, not as charity, 
but as part of his deserved compensation for the extrahazardous (sic) occupation into 
which his Government has forced him. It may be suggested that the cost of this system is 
too great. Personally I have no patience with such a suggestion; I confess that I have only 
compassion for it. If, under this measure, the annual cost of doing justice to our fighting 
men and their dependents should amount to five, six, or seven hundred million dollars per 
annum, at the crest of the load, it is an insignificant sum as compared with what these 
men do for their country and for the world.
124
 
 
 While McAdoo frames his plan as generous and morally just, his analysis 
actually reveals the proposal would by less expensive than the existing system. McAdoo 
writes, “Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the Government will not escape these 
expenditures if this plan of compensation and insurance should be rejected, because the 
[existing] pension system would then be resorted to, and the cost would likely exceed that 
of the proposed plan.”125  
By coupling the problem, politics, and policy streams during an appropriate 
policy window, McAdoo’s entrepreneurial proposal earned wide support among members 
of Congress, including that of a young democrat from Texas – Sam Rayburn, who 
sponsored the bill in the House. Speaking on the House floor, Rayburn states: 
I do not believe that the men who fight for us…should be placed in the attitude of having 
straight- out gratuities from the Government, or that those things should be passed around 
on political favor like we have in the past. I know…that unless we do something now, 
after this war is over that another saturnalia of pension frauds and pension claims will be 
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put up to this Congress. I want to do what I can here to do Justice…during this war and 
have an end to it.
 126
 
Acknowledging Rayburn’s sentiment, the House Commerce Committee felt similarly. 
According to legal scholar Nicholas Parrillo,  
The House Commerce Committee reasoned that, if Congress started the war effort with a 
reasonable and measured promise of benefits, carefully confined to disabilities that were 
service-connected and substantial, it would gain public acceptance and thereby hopefully 
‘erect a certain moral barrier’ to the future expansion of the system.127  
 
With strong support from the administration, the House and Senate unanimously 
approved the WRIA.
128
 Scholar Henry Glasson depicts the new law as “a radical 
departure from the existing pension system… [However] Existing pension laws are not 
disturbed in their application to previous wars.”129 In addition to creating a new Bureau 
of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department, the WRIA provided for families and 
dependents though compulsory allotments from soldier salaries, various compensations in 
case of disability or death, and insurance at an $8 premium for every $1000 of 
coverage.
130
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From 1917 to 1918, some 320,000 Americans died or were wounded overseas.
131
 
The “war to end all wars” concluded with an armistice on 11 November 1918. Over the 
next two years, veterans’ organizations, members of Congress, and presidential 
candidates debated the various veterans’ compensation proposals saturating Washington. 
Acknowledging the low overseas pay and ensuing financial problems facing many of the 
returning doughboys in 1919, Congress “passed a stopgap measure in which the 
government granted an extra $60 – two months’ base pay – to any serviceman mustering 
out, regardless of grade.”132 Overseas newspapers like Stars and Stripes ran headlines 
announcing the soldier “bonus,” embedding the term and notion of additional pay in the 
minds of soldiers and veterans.
133
  
As more costly proposals flooded the Congress throughout 1920, politicians 
attempted to use the bonus as a wedge issue in an election year. During testimony before 
the House Ways and Means Committee on a more generous bonus bill, President 
Wilson’s third Treasury Secretary, David Houston, argued that “to float bonds in the 
amount of $2,000,000,000 or to meet such an additional expenditure out of taxes would 
present grave problems and might result in disaster.”134 Just as advocates for and against 
Civil War pensions had done decades before, Houston framed his argument within the 
context of mounting federal debts and financial crisis. Once again, veterans’ pensions 
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proved to be a partisan issue with Democrats opposing and Republicans favoring more 
generous benefits. The 1920 bonus bill ultimately failed in the Senate as the two billion 
dollar price tag proved unacceptable. 
Influential Veterans’ Organizations 
 This section tests interest group life cycle hypothesis. Specifically, I posit that 
veterans’ interest groups emerge in the wake of conflict, thrive in the policymaking 
process for a period of time, and fade away as a generation of veterans passes on and a 
new generation emerges. Like veterans of the Civil and Spanish American Wars before 
them, World War veterans also looked to veterans organizations for personal camaraderie 
and political advocacy.  
The Grand Army of the Republic Fades Away 
 At the height of its membership in 1890, the GAR numbered some 409,500 Union 
veterans.
135
 While chapter 3 covers GAR’s prestige and influence in great detail, it should 
come as no surprise that GAR’s massive membership rolls coincide with the 1890 
“Billion Dollar Congress” and passage of the most extensive and generous veterans’ 
legislation of the post-Civil War era. But like all member organizations with roots in a 
specific period, conflict, or war, the GAR’s influence would eventually dissipate and give 
way to a new generation of more timeless organizations.  
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While I specifically cover bureaucratic consolidation later in this chapter, briefly 
examining GAR membership in 1921 and 1931, at the inception of the Veterans’ Bureau 
and Veterans’ Administration, is instructive. By 1921, the same year President Harding 
established the Veterans’ Bureau, GAR membership had dropped some 77 percent to 
only 93,000 Union veterans.
136
 Similarly, by 1931, as the new Veterans’ Administration 
began its work, GAR was a shadow of its former self at a mere 16,500 members.
137
 GAR 
held its final encampment in 1949, with only sixteen members in attendance. In 1956, the 
GAR’s last surviving member – Albert Woolsey – passed away.   
Veterans of Foreign Wars Organize 
 Seeing the power and influence of the GAR in securing veterans’ benefits, 
veterans of the Spanish American War (1898) and Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) 
organized into local groups around the country at the end of the nineteenth century. By 
1914, two of the more prominent organizations – the National Association of the Army of 
the Philippines and American Veterans of Foreign Service – merged to form the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars (VFW). According to veterans’ policy scholar, Stephen R. Ortiz, “VFW 
offered membership to servicemen and veterans who had served ‘on foreign shores or in 
hostile waters in any war, campaign or expedition recognized by Congress with a 
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campaign badge or service clasp.’”138 With the American declaration of War in 1917, 
VFW added a new generation of veterans to its humble ranks. 
 Upon their return from the European front, doughboys were slow to join the 
VFW, seeing the organization’s leadership ranks filled by veterans of other foreign wars, 
not the Great War. The modest socioeconomic means and sparse political connections of 
VFW leaders differed from that of other, more powerful veterans’ organizations, namely 
the American Legion. As such, VFW leaders more accurately reflected the lower-middle 
class, small businessmen, skilled and unskilled workers, and clerks that “[made] up the 
majority of the VFW membership.”139 But that reflection did not translate to membership 
numbers. VFW’s membership stood at some 20,000 veterans in 1920, “not appreciably 
larger than it had been in 1917.”140  
Short on numbers and political clout, VFW used its underdog status to advocate 
more radical policy positions than its politically entrenched rival, the American Legion, 
including “persistent and vehement demand for the immediate cash payment of the 
soldier’s bonus…[offering] veterans an alternative to the more conservative Legion.”141 
During the Great Depression, “veterans found in the VFW a newly energetic and 
increasingly powerful organization to champion their causes.”142 With this new energy 
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came larger membership rolls. Fifteen years after its founding, the VFW had finally 
become a powerful player in veterans’ policy. Unlike GAR, however, the VFW did not 
use its new national status for “partisan politics,” though many VFW leaders 
unsuccessfully argued in favor of “direct political involvement” during the New Deal 
bonus battles of 1933 and 1934.
143
     
The American Legion Forms in Paris, 1919 
Like the GAR and VFW before it, the American Legion aimed to organize 
veterans and advocate on their behalf. The Legion has its roots in a 1919 dinner party, 
hosted by Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., at the Allied Officers Club in 
Paris. Following a daylong meeting to address low morale among the troops, Roosevelt 
invited a group of officers to dinner as he “had a most important matter to discuss 
personally and unofficially with the gentlemen in detail” – a veterans’ society.144 Among 
the group of officers were Eric Fisher Wood, George A. White, and William “Wild Bill” 
Donavon, who would later lead the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.
145
 
With its first national convention held in Minneapolis in November, 1919 and 843,013 
dues paying members by 1920, the American Legion immediately dwarfed both GAR at 
its height and the fledgling VFW. Unlike GAR, however, the Legion steered clear of 
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political patronage and partisanship in its dealings with government.
146
 Rather, the 
prominent leaders of the American Legion advocated “Americanism,” including a disdain 
for “Reds” and “Slackers,” a desire to work with local, state, and federal government 
officials, and friendly ties to the business community.
147
 What is more, membership in 
the American Legion was open to any service member of the Great War, including those 
whose service did not send them overseas, unlike the VFW.     
From December 1919 to April 1921, American Legion leaders met frequently 
with government officials to address growing concerns regarding insufficient veterans’ 
compensation and hospitalization policies. For example, due in part to the Legion’s 
intense lobbying effort, the Harding administration dismantled the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance and formed the Veterans’ Bureau in its stead, combining three agencies into 
one.
148
 But the Legion’s presence on Capitol Hill did not stop there.  
The Legion’s nationwide education campaign on the soldiers’ bonus proved 
central to passage of the 1924 Adjusted Compensation Act. The American Legion 
circulated literature to its state delegations to “aid Legion Bonus speakers in debates,” 
framing the bonus in “more dignified” terms – adjusted compensation.149 Unlike the 
VFW, the Legion actually took a conservative and rather indecisive approach to the 
bonus matter. William Pencak writes, “[The Legion] hesitated, changed its mind several 
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times, and ultimately supported a successful measure quite different from the immediate 
cash payment suggested in the twenties or an inflationary scheme…endorsed by the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars in the thirties.”150 Appealing to their patriotism, President 
Herbert Hoover spoke to Legionnaires at their 1930 national convention to address 
growing demands for immediate cash payment of the bonus. Hoover’s speech – the first 
presidential address at an American Legion convention – worked. The Legion 
overwhelmingly voted down a resolution calling for immediate cash payments.
151
 Despite 
acquiescing to President Hoover’s request, the American Legion had proven itself a 
formidable foe and powerful ally, capable of mobilizing national campaigns to its vast 
membership and swaying public opinion on veterans’ benefits.  
The Harding Administration Battles Congress 
Promising a “return to normalcy,” Ohio Senator Warren G. Harding was elected 
president in 1920. By 1921, more bonus measures hit the political agenda. And once 
again, the Treasury Secretary, this time Andrew W. Mellon, argued against them. The 
front page headline of The New York Times on 6 July 1921 reads, “Bonus Bill Will Ruin 
All Economy Plans, Declares Mellon.”152 The article makes multiple references to a letter 
Mellon sent to Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, responding to his inquiries on the 
matter. According to The New York Times, Mellon replied:  
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[This bill] would swell the cost of government and virtually defeat the Administration’s 
program of economy and retrenchment…no such sum could be taken out of the Treasury 
without throwing a corresponding load upon the whole people in the form of increased 
interest charges, increased taxes, and increased cost of living.
153
 
 
This is clearly a strongly rooted economic argument for Democrats, especially the 
question of redistributing national wealth, just as it had been for their predecessors 
following the Civil War. With interest in the bill’s passage still apparent in the Senate, 
President Harding took the unprecedented step to personally address his former 
colleagues and weigh in. Author Roger Daniels writes this of the episode:  
The bonus fight shows [Harding] at his most influential. To stop the bill he did what no 
President before or since has even attempted; he appeared in person before the upper 
chamber and asked its members to recommit a bill that had already been reported out of 
committee and was nearing a vote that was all but certain to be favorable.
154
 
 
  
In his statement, President Harding echoed his Treasury Secretary by asserting 
“the enactment of the compensation bill in the midst of the struggle for readjustment and 
restoration would hinder every effort and greatly, imperil the financial stability of our 
country.”155 Additionally, he framed such compensation as a matter of national gratitude, 
rather than a debt or obligation to soldiers. Despite bitter partisan rancor for his 
unprecedented tactics, President Harding’s efforts were successful and the bill failed. 
Here is an excellent example of the most elite policy entrepreneur coupling the problem, 
politics, and policy streams of an issue to manipulate the political agenda and maintain 
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his policy preference – the status quo. Something to note is the importance of the macro 
politics involved. Once the President of the United States takes up a matter like this in 
such bold fashion, the elite and dynamic policy subsystem between Congress, 
bureaucrats, special interests, and the media breaks down and no longer retains 
jurisdictional sovereignty of the policy venue.
156
  
With three years of brewing animosity propelling another bonus measure forward, 
Congress considered the bill again in the spring of 1922. The legislation passed the 
House and Senate with overwhelming bipartisan support.
157
 On 19 September 1922, 
however, President Harding vetoed the bill, citing budgetary concerns. Congress fell 
short of the required two-thirds vote to override the veto.
158
 Within a year, Harding would 
be dead and the question of veterans’ pension policy would be left to his successor, 
Calvin Coolidge.    
Consolidating the Veterans’ Bureaucracy  
 This section tests bureaucratic consolidation hypothesis. I submit bureaucratic 
consolidation during the interwar period raised the visibility of veterans’ policy within 
government and professionalized and streamlined the delivery of veterans’ services. To 
this end, President Harding’s most significant contribution to veterans’ policy was not 
legislative, but bureaucratic.  
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On 9 August 1921, President Harding signed legislation establishing the 
Veterans’ Bureau, consolidating veterans’ services under one agency and opening a new 
chapter in the pension story. The 1921 Sweet Act, sponsored by Representative Burton 
Sweet of Iowa, “established an independent bureau under the President to be known as 
the Veterans’ Bureau, the director of which shall be appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”159 This bill effectively raised the profile of 
veterans’ issues by establishing a quasi-cabinet level position reporting directly to 
President Harding.
160
 The Pension Bureau meanwhile, still responsible for administering 
pensions to Civil War veterans, remained within the Department of the Interior and left 
out of the new bureaucratic structure. As bureaucracy is a reflection of values, this 
bureaucratic reorganization formally signaled the government’s focus and attention had 
shifted from the aging Civil War generation to the young World War generation.     
Beyond simply creating a new agency, the Sweet Act made three significant 
changes to the veterans’ bureaucratic landscape. First, the legislation abolished the Office 
of the Director of War Risk Insurance and transferred the entire agency (Bureau of War 
Risk Insurance) from the Treasury Department to the new Veterans’ Bureau. Second, the 
Veterans’ Bureau assumed responsibility for the Rehabilitation Division of the Federal 
Board of Vocational Education and Veterans’ Medical Division in the United States 
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Public Health Service. Third, the legislation authorized the Veterans’ Bureau Director to 
establish a central office in Washington, DC and as many as fourteen regional veterans’ 
offices with corresponding sub-offices around the country.
161
 Regional offices 
represented a significant step toward providing responsive services to a new generation of 
veterans. A 26 May 1921 New York Times article on the legislation reads: 
The fourteen regional offices, through the terms of the proposed act, may exercise full 
powers, hear complaints, examine applicants, rate and award compensation claims, grant 
medical, dental, surgical and hospital care, make insurance awards and grant vocational 
training. This in effect means that there would be fourteen points through the United 
States where action on any one of those matters could be promptly obtained, instead of 
the existing system whereby all such matters have to be acted upon in Washington.
162
  
 
Altering the bureaucratic landscape did not come without opposition. For 
instance, the Labor and Interior Departments – fearing the loss of jurisdiction and 
bureaucratic autonomy – opposed the Veterans’ Bureau on grounds that the “need for 
hospitalization and rehabilitation [of veterans] would soon pass.”163 This argument was 
clearly a shortsighted play for bureaucratic turf as veterans of the World War generation 
would undoubtedly require continued hospital and rehabilitation services of various sorts 
throughout the remainder of their lives – services that could be more effectively delivered 
under the new bureaucratic structure.   
While the Sweet Act did not specifically exclude aging Civil War veterans from 
accessing benefits or medical attention at the various regional offices, the legislative 
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intent clearly favored World War veterans. From a bureaucratic perspective, creating a 
new Veteran’s Bureau to coexist with the Pension Bureau in the Interior Department 
allowed the former to grow and innovate while the latter phased out of existence as its 
elderly Civil War veterans passed away. Additionally, a new bureaucracy – drawing 
elements from across government under one organization – allowed the director to 
establish his own systems and processes to prevent the fraud, abuse, and corruption that 
plagued the Pension Bureau in the years following the Civil War. These systems and 
processes, in turn, would promote efficiency and effectiveness, lending political 
legitimacy to the Veterans’ Bureau’s march toward bureaucratic autonomy. The 1922 
Annual Report of the Veterans’ Bureau highlights the need to establish the bureau: 
[D]uring the period following the armistice, [demand for services] resulted in greatly 
expanding each of these [three] organizations until the divisions handling veteran relief 
work overshadowed the parent organizations. The new work demanded freedom of action 
to meet emergencies. Organizations built up for other purposes were cumbersome in 
situations that could not be anticipated, and frequent delays were occasioned by conflicts 
with established methods of procedure which were inadequate but which could not be 
ignored entirely. The Director of the former Bureau of War Risk Insurance was 
responsible to the Secretary of the Treasury, who delegated his work to an assistant 
secretary in charge of the bureau. Such an organization made administration 
cumbersome, and many regulations necessary for the proper functioning of the bureau 
were lost in the process of being approved by numerous ranking officials.
164
 
 
 
Recognizing the need for change, President Harding appointed Charles R. Forbes 
as the first director of the Veteran’s Bureau on 09 August 1921. Upon his appointment, 
Forbes “immediately began taking steps to place in effect the provisions of the new act 
for the establishment of a single organization charged with the responsibility of 
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administering all phases of the service rendered to the disabled veterans.”165 As director, 
Forbes’ role is described as follows:  
The director of this independent bureau has full authority, subject to the general direction 
of the President of the United States, to administer and enforce the laws relating to 
compensation, insurance, rehabilitation, and medical care and treatment of veterans who 
are entitled to these services.
166
 
 
 
On 10 August 1921, Forbes issued several General Orders to the nascent 
Veterans’ Bureau regarding staffing, rules, structure, and systems. First, Forbes set out to 
staff his new agency. General Order 1 states, “All officers and employees of the Bureau 
of War Risk Insurance [and Rehabilitation Division of the Federal Board for Vocational 
Education] on August 9, 1921, are hereby transferred to similar positions in the Veterans’ 
Bureau.”167 Second, Forbes establishes rules to govern his new institution. General Order 
2 states,  
It is hereby that there shall remain in full force and effect all Treasury Decisions, 
Conjoint Regulations, Regulations, Divisional Instructions, General Orders, Bureau 
Orders, Field Orders, News Letters, and Treasury Department Orders, Instructions, 
Circulars, etc., heretofore applicable to the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, and all Rules, 
Regulations, Circular Letters, and other Instructions heretofore applicable to the 
Rehabilitation Division of the Federal Board for Vocational Education, until such time as 
the same may be specifically amended or revoked.
168
      
 
 General Orders 3 and 4 deal with bureaucratic structure. For instance, General 
Order 3 establishes the 14 regional district offices in major cities across the country as 
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authorized in the Sweet legislation. Further, General Order 3 clearly assigns jurisdictions 
for each regional district office. For example, “District No. 1 [headquartered in Boston, 
MA] shall consist of the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and 
Rhode Island.”169 General Order 4 transfers various sections of the Rehabilitation 
Division to other divisions within the Veterans’ Bureau, including but not limited to the 
personnel, medical relations, and statistical sections.
170
 
 General Order 5 outlines procedures for making disability compensation awards 
and determining eligibility for vocational training. The order further dictates the type and 
number of application forms veterans must submit, procedures for submitting claims to 
Washington from the district offices for processing, and systems for filing claims.
171
 
While not as comprehensive as the formal regulations published by the Veterans’ Bureau, 
these General Orders enabled Director Forbes to immediately consolidate and establish a 
working bureaucracy to serve a new generation of veterans.    
 In addition to bureaucratic consolidation, the Veterans’ Bureau’s core 
organizational strength came through its district offices. To build the organizational 
capacity necessary to deliver efficient and effective services to veterans, Director Forbes 
and his Manger of District Offices, Colonel (Ret.) George E. Ijams, maintained frequent 
contact with the district offices. For instance, in an October 1921 memorandum, Director 
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Forbes instructs district managers to submit “an itemized account of all expenditures 
classified by regional offices and sub-offices, including the names, classifications and 
salaries of all staff officers, experts, assistants and employees.”172 In a November 1921 
memorandum, Ijams requests that district managers “kindly furnish this office the 
information regarding SUB-DISTRICT OFFICES (sic),” including whether the Sub-
District Office is “fully equipped to handle all phases of the work of the U.S. Veterans’ 
Bureau, such as Insurance, Compensation, Training, Medical, etc.?”173  
 The Veterans’ Bureau also structured a close working relationship between the 
district offices and the American Legion. In a 15 November 1921 memo addressed to all 
district managers, Forbes attempts to “make more definite the present arrangements” 
between the district offices and American Legion. He writes:  
[T]he American Legion has, with the consent of the Bureau, placed a liaison 
representative in each district office for the purpose of assisting the disabled man in the 
proper presentation of claims…It is clearly to be understood that the liaison 
representative has no official connection with the Veterans’ Bureau…[but] that he work 
in the spirit of helpful cooperation in the solution of the ex-service man’s 
problem…Liaison representatives are entitled to assistance in the form of office space 
and stenographic aid…it has been found that the liaison representatives can be of the 
utmost value to the Bureau...
174
  
 
Though Forbes goes on to allow Legion representatives to have access to the Bureau’s 
General Orders, regulations, and field orders, he forbids them from “access to any claims 
folders or rehabilitation folders.” No doubt, like the Pension Bureau and GAR in the post-
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Civil War era, the newly established Veterans’ Bureau hoped for a similar relationship 
with the American Legion in the post-World War era. As the veterans’ pension policy 
subsystem consolidated during this period, this instance of close institutional interaction 
and collaboration highlights the insular nature of subsystem policymaking.     
In addition to reviewing claims, the Veterans’ Bureau required an institutional 
mechanism to review appealed claims at the national and district levels. In a November 
1921 draft memorandum, Forbes directs the fourteen district offices to immediately 
appoint a district Board of Appeals comprised of three members: district legal advisor, 
medical officer, and chief of claims division.
175
 In a subsequent letter and memorandum, 
Ijams clarifies the board’s purpose and empowers district managers to administer oaths 
and take affidavits “pursuant to Section 10 of the Act of August 9, 1921 establishing the 
Veterans’ Bureau.”176 In his letter to district managers, Ijams writes:  
The Board will have jurisdiction to hear all appeals made either by the claimant or his 
duly authorized agent or the U.S. Veterans’ Bureau on its own motion, on any question 
for claim for compensation, vocational training, hospitalization or medical treatment 
under the laws under which the U.S. Veterans’ Bureau operates.177    
          
Beyond General Orders and efforts to setup organizational capacity in the district 
offices, the Veteran’s Bureau established a series of rules and systems to deal with 
veterans’ issues. From 1921 to 1930, the Veteran’ Bureau produced 218 regulations 
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covering everything from “payment of compensation and insurance where the beneficiary 
is an inmate of any asylum or hospital for the insane”178 to “procedures regarding re-
examinations to determine changes in degree of service connected disability.”179 These 
regulations served to professionalize the bureau’s field workforce, giving employees the 
tools to fairly apply rules, effectively administer, and efficiently adjudicate beneficiary 
claims.   
The new and consolidated bureaucratic structure gave veterans’ the peace of mind 
of knowing there was only one agency they had to work through to receive benefits and 
employees the resources to operate through formal, rather than ad-hoc, agency structures. 
According to the 1922 Veterans’ Bureau Annual Report: 
Beneficiaries were assured that there could be no further avoiding of responsibility 
because of dealing with separate organizations, and officials of the bureau concerned 
were relieved to conduct the consolidation of all veterans' relief activities upon the basis 
of legal authority rather than upon working agreements…as they previously had been 
trying to do.
180
 
 
With a newfound energy and momentum to deliver veterans’ services, seemingly 
nothing could derail the Veterans’ Bureau’s efforts; that is, nothing until an 
executive scandal rocked the bureau in 1923.  
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Scandal at the Veterans’ Bureau 
Despite his exceptional work consolidating the Veterans’ Bureau and putting 
rules, systems, and procedures in place to streamline efficiency, optimize service, and 
prevent fraud and corruption, Forbes failed to live up to expectations for effective and 
ethical administration. Forbes, embroiled in a corruption scandal, resigned as Director of 
the Veterans’ Bureau effective 28 February 1923. In his stead, President Harding 
appointed Brigadier General (Ret.) Frank T. Hines as Director of the Veterans’ Bureau.  
In his undated letter of resignation, Forbes cites ailing health and an inability to 
render complete service to the bureau.
181
 However, a 17 February 1923 Washington Post 
article covering Forbes’ resignation notes a glaring omission, “There was no mention, 
either in the letter or by officials at the executive offices, of the charges of improper 
administration in the bureau, which recently have led to demands for an investigation by 
a committee of Congress.”182        
Forbes’ resignation demonstrates that even the most innovative bureaucratic 
structure cannot overcome executive corruption at an agency’s senior ranks. Soon after 
Forbes’ resignation, the US Senate appointed a Select Committee on Investigation of the 
Veterans’ Bureau to initiate congressional hearings in October of 1923 and investigate 
allegations of misappropriation and corruption. In his opening statement, the committee’s 
general counsel, Major General John F. O’Ryan contends:  
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[M]ore than $467,000,00 were expended by the bureau during the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1923, and yet, in spite of these lavish and unprecedented expenditures, there existed 
during 1922 a growing feeling of dissatisfaction among the disabled. This feeling was 
shared by veterans generally, and by their representative organizations as well…As a 
result of this increasing dissatisfaction, the Senate, in the closing days of the Sixty-
seventh Congress, appointed this committee to conduct this investigation.
183
   
 
Following a lengthy congressional investigation, federal grand jury, and appeals process, 
Forbes entered Fort Leavenworth federal penitentiary on 20 March 1926 – three years 
after his resignation from the Veterans’ Bureau – to serve a “two-year sentence for 
conspiring to defraud the government in [manipulating] contracts for the construction of 
hospitals for veterans.”184 Despite Forbes’ resignation and incarceration, the Veterans’ 
Bureau retained many of the innovative bureaucratic structures he emplaced and 
flourished under Frank T. Hines’ effective and ethical leadership throughout his 22 year 
tenure.   
The World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 
As the Veteran’s Bureau worked to recover from scandal and administer the 
benefits already established by law, legislation for a federal bonus bill stood still. Seeing 
the federal government abandon its promise of a bonus for the “boys,” 19 state 
governments intervened with bonus measures of their own.
185
 By 1924, these 19 states 
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had issued $361,970,141 in bonds for World War veterans with an additional 
$54,100,000 in bonus proposals still pending.
186
 With states like Illinois taking the lead in 
providing generous benefits for veterans, a federal bonus bill for the doughboys would 
find itself back on the political agenda in the coming election year.    
 David Greenberg, presidential historian and Coolidge biographer has a unique 
perspective on veterans in the 1920s that is worth noting. He writes, “[I]n the 1920s 
veterans were seen as a bloc that was vaguely radical and narrowly self-interested, and in 
the days before Social Security and similar benefits their demand for a bonus struck many 
Americans as socialistic.”187 Though Greenberg makes no reference to support such a 
contrarian claim, he at least offers an alternative perspective on the social construction of 
veterans during this period that is worth exploring further. Even though elites like 
Harding, Mellon, and Coolidge generally had pleasant things to say about veterans 
publicly, accepting Greenberg’s premise might lead one to speculate that those statements 
were merely platitudes disguising deep seated hostility and resentment towards veterans 
and their sense of entitlement. In a letter to the editor of The New York Times, Annie Peck 
of New York offers, “I am glad to know that a large and better part of those who rendered 
service, who did their duty, no more, refuse to be counted among the beggars…the 
people as a whole are disgusted by the playing of politics in Washington…”188 It seems 
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that if in fact Coolidge and fellow opponents of the bonus bill harbored malcontent, as 
Greenberg suggests and Peck proclaims, they relied upon social constructions of veterans 
as “beggars” to support for their veto actions.   
 Despite the rancor of the period, the summer of 1924 proved pivotal to the bonus 
movement. The World War Adjusted Compensation Act passed both chambers of 
Congress with strong support. On 15 May 1924, President Coolidge vetoed the 
legislation. This time however, the Congress managed a veto override of 313 to 78 in the 
House and 59 to 26 in the Senate.
189
 The bill defined a veteran as anyone who had 
honorably served for 60 days anytime from 5 April 1917 to 12 November 1918. It 
provided an adjusted compensation of $1.25 per day of overseas service and $1.00 per 
day of stateside service with caps at $625 and $500, respectively. Veterans entitled to $50 
or less could receive an “adjusted service pay” while veterans entitled to more than $50 
would be issued an “adjusted service certificate.” Additionally, certificates would be 
payable in 20 years (1 January 1945) with four percent interest.
190
 Total face value for 
these certificates could reach as high as $1,600, though about $1,000 was more typical.
191
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Bonus Expeditionary Force Invades Washington 
After a five year legislative battle (longer than American participation in the war 
itself), the World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 was finally written into law. 
By the summer of 1932, nearly three years into the Great Depression, swarms of 
unemployed and disgruntled veterans’ delegations made their way to Washington from 
across the country with the hope of securing cash for their certificates. The Bonus 
Expeditionary Force, or Bonus Army, set up “Hooverville” encampments across the 
Potomac in Anacostia and occupied Washington in protest. Acting on their behalf, long 
time bonus advocate and policy entrepreneur in his own right, Senator Wright Patman 
proposed legislation that would issue immediate payment for certificates. When the 
measure failed to pass the Senate and, in an election year, died for political purposes, the 
Bonus Army refused to accept defeat. Responding to their continued and defiant 
assembly, the Hoover administration mobilized elements of US Army to disperse the 
crowd. Forces commanded by General Douglas MacArthur burned the encampments, 
forcefully repelled rioters, and employed tanks to achieve his objectives, as “tanks are 
particularly valuable at quelling civil disorder.”192 This ugly episode led to numerous 
injuries and countless arrests, a far cry from the calamitous, though generally peaceful 
Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783. In the end, the bonus marchers would have the final word 
as a Democratic Congress passed the Adjusted Compensation Act of 1936, affirmed with 
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President Roosevelt’s signature.193 This is ironic considering the Republican Party’s 
historical claim on being the party for veterans.       
From the Veterans’ Bureau to the Veterans’ Administration 
Forbes’ 1923 resignation from the Veterans’ Bureau cleared the way for his 
replacement, Brigadier General (Ret.) Frank T. Hines. As director and later administrator, 
Hines served the Veterans’ Bureau and Veterans’ Administration for 22 years and 
“proved an able and honest administrator.”194 Like Forbes, Hines would also oversee a 
reorganization of the Veterans’ Bureau. In 1924, Hines restructured the bureau into “six 
services: medical and rehabilitation, claims and insurance, finance, supply, planning, and 
control. Under the reorganization, the Bureau had 73 sub-district offices responsible for 
dealing with beneficiaries and claimants…”195 In addition to in-house reshuffling, Hines 
led the Veterans’ Bureau in its transition to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs within 
his first decade on the job. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Pension Bureau and National Homes for Disabled 
Veterans continued to operate independent of the Veterans’ Bureau. In 1929, however, 
South Dakota Congressman, Royal C. Johnson introduced legislation to change that. 
Citing disparate pension and hospitalization policies for veterans of the Civil War, 
Spanish American War, and World War, Johnson proposed that the president be 
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“authorized by Executive order to transfer or to coordinate or consolidate” the three 
agencies into one.
196
 To illustrate the disparities in pension and hospitalization policies, 
Johnson states:  
Another difficulty that comes in is the fact that two men from different wars or the same 
war may be in a hospital with exactly or apparently the same injuries; one may be 
receiving total permanent compensation because he can connect his injury with his 
service, and the man in the next bed receives nothing because he cannot connect his 
injury with the service.
197     
 
On 3 July 1930, the Seventy-First Congress passed “An act to authorize the 
President to consolidate and coordinate governmental activities affecting war veterans.” 
With legislative authorization in hand, President Hoover issued an Executive order on 21 
July 1930 stating: 
[B]y virtue of the authority vested in me by said law, the United States Veterans' Bureau, 
the Bureau of Pensions, and the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Solders are 
hereby consolidated and coordinated into an establishment to be known as the Veterans' 
Administration, and the duties, powers, and functions vested by law in the United States 
Veterans' Bureau, the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Solders, and in the Bureau 
of Pensions, and the personnel of the United States Veterans' Bureau, the Bureau of 
Pensions, and the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, and the records and 
papers pertaining to the work thereof, and the public property belonging thereto, are 
hereby transferred to the Veterans' Administration.
198
    
 
 
In establishing the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, like Warren Harding and the 
Veterans’ Bureau before him, President Hoover again raised the visibility of veterans’ 
issue. As President Harding had established a direct report relationship with the director 
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of the Veterans’ Bureau, President Hoover maintained this reporting relationship with the 
new administrator of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.199      
Although the three organizations continued to operate separately until 1 July 
1931, the new department did make progress toward consolidation immediately 
following President Hoover’s order. According to the 1931 Annual Report of the 
Veterans’ Administration: 
 
Within a few months after the issuance of the Executive order, all finance, supply, and 
construction activities had been combined or more closely coordinated, and thereafter for 
the balance of the year continued study was made of the procedural and organizational 
changes necessary to carry out the general reorganizational plan with the leas possible 
friction and with the utmost dispatch.
200
   
 
 
 In addition to simply studying consolidation, the report asserts, “experience to 
date conclusively shows that the reasons advanced for [consolidation] have proven sound 
and promise for the future…”201 The report continues, “Under consolidation it has been 
possible to establish a single point of contact for veterans for all wars for the 
considerations of claims…It has been possible to harmonize rulings and procedure of the 
Government…Most especially…maximum utilization of existing facilities…”202 
From the inception of the Veterans’ Bureau to its consolidation as part of the new 
Veterans’ Administration, effective bureaucratic consolidation and reorganization clearly 
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does not occur overnight. Restructuring and reorganizing massive bureaucracies, 
especially those guaranteed some level of autonomy as a matter of moral protection for 
their services and beneficiaries, requires managerial expertise and an appreciation for the 
multiple dimensions of public management.
203
 While Forbes did good work in first 
consolidating the Veteran’s Bureau to streamline processes, his personal failings and 
corruption no doubt detracted from the bureau’s effectiveness. Fortunately, Director 
Hines’ 22 year tenure at the Veteran’s Bureau and Veterans’ Administration enabled him 
to lead the transformation of the bureaucracy into a more efficient and effective 
organization in the service of America’s veterans.     
National Defense Efficiency Act of 1935 
The interwar period would see one final and significant addition to military 
pension policy that is worth noting before moving to the next chapter – the National 
Defense Efficiency Act of 1935. Section five of the National Defense Efficiency Act of 
1935 formalized the voluntary retirement policy for those service members with at least 
15 years of service and no more than 29 years of service, leaving them with a pension of 
“annual pay equal to the product of 2 1/2 per centum of his active duty annual pay at the 
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time of his retirement, multiplied by a number equal to the years of his active service not 
in excess of twenty-nine years.”204  
Though this law provided for a voluntary retirement with pension, it did nothing 
to manage the promotion rate or career progression of service members. Most 
importantly, the National Defense Efficiency Act foreshadows postwar legislative 
reorganization that will remake the veterans’ pension policy and military personnel 
policy subsystems. By 7 December 1941, however, restructuring pensions and the 
military’s personnel management system would be the least of anyone’s concerns as the 
United States entered World War II. 
Summary 
  This chapter operationalizes interest group lifecycle hypothesis and bureaucratic 
consolidation hypothesis. GAR’s slow disappearance and growing irrelevance in early to 
middle twentieth century policy debates demonstrates that organizations with roots in a 
specific event, conflict, or war ultimately fade away and cease to exist. Further, the 
emergence of the VFW and American Legion as powerful veterans’ service organizations 
with thriving memberships and powerful political influence during the interwar period 
confirm interest group lifecycle hypothesis. 
I contend bureaucratic consolidation during the interwar period raised the 
visibility of veterans’ policy within government and professionalized and streamlined the 
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delivery of veterans’ services. First, the 1921 Sweet Act consolidated three disparate 
veterans’ agencies across government into one bureaucracy. Second, the organizational 
structure of the Veterans’ Bureau, particularly the fourteen regional offices, sought to 
provide responsive service to veterans through a professionalized workforce and efficient 
delivery systems. Despite Director Forbes’ corruption in the early days of the Veterans’ 
Bureau, his replacement, Frank Hines, effectively led the agency for the next 22 years. In 
short, the facts support the bureaucratic consolidation hypothesis. What is more, the 
Veterans’ bureau’s story highlights the important and painstaking work entrusted to 
bureaucrats in the delivery of services for an advantaged target population.    
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CHAPTER 4: WORLD WAR II AND SUBSYSTEM TRANSFORMATION 
 This chapter tests subsystem split hypothesis. As such, I contend that veterans’ 
pension policy and military personnel policy effectively split into two separate 
subsystems in the wake of World War II, significantly reducing the number of institutions 
and actors interested in military personnel policy. This subsystem split also served to 
minimize the scope of conflict within the military personnel policy subsystem. At the 
heart of this subsystem split is legislative reorganization. More specifically, four 
significant pieces of legislation forever changed the landscape for veterans’ pension and 
military personnel policy: the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill), 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, National Security Act of 1947, and Officer 
Personnel Act of 1947.   
 In the summer of 1945, the American military totaled more than 12 million 
personnel. The army and army air corps had approximately 8.2 million soldiers and 
airmen on its rosters while the navy counted just shy of 4.1 million sailors and marines.
205
 
By the end of 1948, the number of total army personnel plummeted to just 554,000 
soldiers.
206
 This massive and seemingly overnight military drawdown is nothing short of 
remarkable and due in large measure to congressional action.  
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Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 
Soon after V-J Day in September 1945, under significant and persistent pressure 
from Congress, the US military began a precipitous and chaotic worldwide 
demobilization, bringing troops home by the boatload over the next several months.
207
 
Much like demobilization following the American Revolution and the subsequent 
Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783, frustrated GIs took to the streets. In January 1946, with the 
war over and upset they were still overseas, some 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers peacefully 
gathered in protest at the commanding general’s headquarters in Manila.208 Similar 
incidents occurred in places like Hawaii, London, Paris, Frankfurt, Shanghai, and 
Calcutta, among others.
209
 Though these demonstrations never amounted to anything 
dangerous, reintegrating an entire generation of veterans to civilian life would require 
legislative foresight.    
Suzanne Mettler, author of Soldiers to Citizens (easily the most important 
scholarly work on the GI Bill), captures the sense of postwar anxiety in the United States. 
She writes, “[P]ostwar planners were motivated by the…practical goal of reincorporating 
returning veterans into society, and, not least, by fears of social unrest.”210 With 
memories of the Bonus Army in mind, policymakers sought to ensure troops were setup 
for success upon their return by “enabling veterans to retool themselves for active 
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citizenship in peacetime.”211 This retooling required a mix of employment, education, and 
training opportunities and “represented a departure” from Civil War veterans’ pensions 
and World War adjusted compensation.
212
  
The American Legion Weighs In 
With multiple bills addressing veterans’ postwar reintegration circulating around 
Congress, the American Legion, still part of the powerful veterans lobby, urged members 
of Congress to combine them into one massive piece of legislation based on the Legion’s 
own legislative framework. This would ensure the disparate bills would not die in 
separate committees. The Legion’s 1943 framework for a GI Bill of Rights called for ten 
elements: 1) educational opportunity; 2) vocational training; 3) unemployment 
compensation; 4) home, farm, and small business loans; 5) review of discharges; 6) 
adequate hospitalization; 7) prompt settlement of disability claims; 8) mustering-out pay; 
9) veterans’ employment services; 10) concentration of all veterans functions in the 
Veterans’ Administration.213 In short, “the Legion, through the GI Bill, proposed to 
restore the citizen soldiers, as nearly as possible, to a competitive position in the pursuits 
of normal civil life equal to that of those who had stayed home.”214 
The Legion’s framework for veterans’ readjustment proved far more generous 
than President Roosevelt’s own recommendations, as outlined by the Armed Forces 
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Committee on Post-War Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel. For instance, 
the committee recommended one year of educational benefits to every service member 
who served six months and additional education benefits of one to three years for a 
“limited number of exceptionally able ex-service personnel.”215 Preferring its version of 
the bill to the president’s, the Legion turned to one of its own, Senator Joel Bennett Clark 
of Missouri, to spearhead the legislative effort in January 1944. Mettler notes, “Over the 
next six months, the American Legion proceeded – through its vast grassroots network 
and public relations apparatus – to marshal critical and widespread support for the GI 
Bill.”216 Following months of persistent opposition by the VFW,217 legislative wrangling 
for votes, and a deadlocked conference committee in Congress, President Roosevelt 
signed the bill into law on 22 June 1944.
218
  
An Alternative Form of Compensation 
With millions of soldiers, sailors, and marines returning home, the government 
turned to the recently enacted Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, or GI Bill of 
Rights, to help absorb the influx of veterans. In lieu of monetary compensation for 
service that characterized veterans’ pensions in earlier eras, the most popular aspects of 
                                                          
215 Servicemen’s Education and Training Act of 1944, Hearings on S. 1295 and S. 1509, Before the 
Committee on Education and Labor, 78
th
 Congress, 10 (1944) (recommendations of the Armed Forces 
Committee on Post-War Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel). 
216 Mettler, 21. 
217 The VFW vigorously opposed the GI Bill, preferring more traditional forms of compensation for 
returning veterans, including especially adjusted compensation or pensions. The VFW argued that soldiers 
would be without work and need cash, not a diploma. 
218 David Camelon, “How the First GI Bill Was Written Part II,” The American Legion Magazine, February 
1969, 26 and 48-51. The American Legion Magazine reprinted Camelon’s 1949 eyewitness account of 
Congressman John Gibson’s overnight flight from Georgia to Washington, DC to break the conference 
committee’s deadlock to pass the GI Bill.  
92 
 
the 1944 GI Bill included the education benefits, vocational training, and home, farm, 
and small business loans that the American Legion advocated. Taken in its entirety, the 
GI Bill actually served as an alternative form of compensation that enabled veterans who 
separated from the military to successfully transition back to civilian life. More 
importantly, the GI Bill proved to be a vehicle into the middle class that spurred 
nationwide social innovation, deep civic engagement, and active political participation. In 
1948, some 900,000 veterans were enrolled in colleges around the country, not including 
those using vocational training benefits.
219
 The Veterans’ Administration more than 
tripled its workforce to account for the increased demand in claims processing.
220
  
Beyond what the GI Bill enabled a generation of veterans to accomplish in their 
postwar lives, this significant piece of legislation ensured the Veterans’ Administration 
would be responsible for its effective implementation. With Frank Hines still leading the 
Veterans’ Administration after more than two decades, the VA seemed well positioned to 
assume this massive bureaucratic undertaking. Additionally, with no traditional veterans’ 
pension or universal readjustment compensation to speak of, the GI Bill promised that 
matters of retirement policy eligibility and implementation could be left to the 
Departments of War and Navy, later the Department of Defense, setting the stage for the 
formation of the military personnel policy subsystem, separate from the veterans’ pension 
policy subsystem.      
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Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
With the war nearing its end in early 1945 and a massive demobilization just over 
the horizon, politicians and policymakers began to shift focus to other pressing matters of 
governance. In particular, leaders in Washington set their sights on developing modern 
functions of government to meet the demands of the postwar world. Among these 
behemoth tasks was a reorganization of the internal institutions and mechanisms of 
Congress. In January 1945, the 79
th
 Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 18 (H. 
Con. Res. 18) calling for the formation of a Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress. The Joint Committee would “make a full and complete study of the 
organization and operation of the Congress of the United States and…recommend 
improvements in such organization and operation with a view toward strengthening the 
Congress, simplifying its operations, improving its relationships.”221  
The Joint Committee Recommends Restructure 
On 4 March 1946, the Joint Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Robert 
M. La Follette of Wisconsin, submitted its findings to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and Speaker of the House. Among other suggestions, the Joint Committee 
recommended that Congress undertake a massive overhaul of its committee system by 
merging “closely related committees into one where their jurisdictions overlap or where 
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they deal with similar subjects.”222 According to its staff director, George B. Galloway, 
the Joint Committee’s objectives with regard to committee reorganization were to 
“streamline and simplify congressional committee structure, eliminate the use of special 
or select committees, clarify committee duties and reduce jurisdictional disputes, and 
regularize and publicize committee procedures.”223   
For the Senate, the Joint Committee recommended that the 33 standing 
committees be reduced to 16. Among the mergers, the Senate would combine the 
Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs into the Committee 
on Armed Services. Similarly, the House’s 48 committees would be reduced to 18. Here 
again, the House Committees on Military Affairs and Naval Affairs would be combined 
into one Committee on Armed Services.
224
 The Joint Committee did not stop there. 
Additionally, it recommended the committees on Pensions and Veterans’ Finance in the 
Senate and the committees on Pensions, Invalid Pensions, and World War Veterans’ 
Legislation in the House be merged into one Committee on Veterans’ Affairs for each 
chamber.
225
 
With a framework for reorganizing Congress in place, the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 not only formally established the Committees on Armed 
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Services but also set their respective sizes and clearly delineated their jurisdictions. For 
example, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) called for 13 Senators while the 
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) called for 33 Representatives.
226
 With regard 
to legislative jurisdictions, the committees would be responsible for the common defense, 
War Department, Navy Department, and “pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits 
and privileges of members of the armed services,” among other things.227 Meanwhile, the 
Committees on Veterans’ Affairs would assume sole responsibility for matters of 
veterans’ pensions, compensation, and life insurance.228      
Beyond simply reorganizing committee structure, the Joint Committee also 
recommended measures for stronger committee oversight of the administrative functions 
of government, including each committee’s corresponding bureaucracy.229 By combining 
committees and advocating stronger congressional oversight of bureaucracy, the Joint 
Committee’s recommendations sowed the seeds of more efficient policy subsystems 
across government. Remarkably, these aforementioned structural reforms remain in place 
today. In addition to creating the modern committee system and establishing the 
congressional cornerstones for policy subsystems across government, the LRA of 1946 
also presaged legislative and structural reforms in the bureaucracy, especially the 
National Military Establishment.  
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National Security Act of 1947 
A product of compromise and conflict, the National Security Act of 1947 sought 
to unify the National Military Establishment under one cabinet-level secretary – the 
Secretary of Defense. Under the previous structure, the Secretary of War and Secretary of 
the Navy both held cabinet level positions with the ability to make direct 
recommendations to the president. Under the new system, the Secretary of the Army 
(formerly Secretary of War), Secretary of the Navy, and newly created Secretary of the 
Air Force lost their cabinet level status and became subordinates to the Secretary of 
Defense. While this new structure presented the appearance of unification, the military 
departments maintained a great deal of autonomy over their internal affairs. To make 
matters worse, the legislation only authorized the Secretary of Defense to appoint “three 
special assistants to advise and assist him in the performance of his duties” and military 
assistants detailed from the services, but not a “military staff.”230 As the official history of 
the Department of Defense notes, “The act itself was essentially an expression of purpose 
and intent; it remained to be implemented.”231 
To implement the National Security Act, President Truman turned to Secretary of 
the Navy James V. Forrestal. Taking his oath of office only hours after passage of the act, 
Secretary Forrestal appointed trusted former aids and Navy men to two of the special 
assistant positions, Marx Leva and Wilfred J. McNeil. On Leva’s recommendation, 
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Forrestal appointed John H. Ohly as his third special assistant. Ohly specialized in 
“manpower and related matters during the war” and served as special assistant to the 
Secretary of War.
232
 Ohly brought balance to Forrestal’s lopsided Navy appointments.  
As secretary, Forrestal empowered his special assistants with a wide range of 
policy responsibilities, preferring they not be consumed by the “dustpan chores” of 
bureaucratic administration. Ohly, in particular, “handled matters concerning 
international affairs, manpower, reserves, and health that would later require the services 
of several special assistant secretaries and special assistants to the Secretary of 
Defense.”233 For all intents and purposes, Ohly was the first personnel executive in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).       
The Personnel Policy Board Advises Secretary Forrestal  
Despite Ohly’s expertise, the challenges facing the postwar military were far too 
great for one person to handle. In 1948, Secretary Forrestal formed the Personnel Policy 
Board to address the “avalanche of personnel problems,” including reforming the military 
pay structure, creating a uniform military justice system, and addressing matters of 
morale, recruiting, retirement, reserve forces, housing, recreation and welfare, the officer 
grade structure, and military personnel in politics.
234
 Steven L. Reardon, author of the 
Defense Department’s official history, writes:  
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World War II and the demobilization that followed focused sharp attention on the human 
element in the armed forces and the problems associated with people. The postwar 
standing force was far larger than ever before in peacetime and it raised problems of 
recruitment, training, and retention of officers and enlisted personnel that proved difficult 
to resolve. Questions of a fundamental nature had to be answered…Since many of these 
questions involved issues common to all of the services, they seemed to require some sort 
of a unified approach and, to some extent, the development of common policies and 
programs.
235
 
  
 Under direction of the appointed chairman, the Personnel Policy Board’s 
responsibilities and functions included “policies for recruitment, pay and allowances, job 
classification, inter-service exchange and transfer of personnel, promotions, standards of 
efficiency, separation and retirement, and recreation and welfare.”236 Despite this massive 
policy portfolio and the postwar military drawdown, the board was the smallest 
organization in the new National Military Establishment with only 35 civilian staffers and 
12 military officers.
237
 From the advent of the modern military establishment, military 
personnel policies clearly garnered only limited bureaucratic attention and resources, 
despite the enormous responsibilities under the board’s charter. 
Secretary Marshall Nominates a Personnel Expert 
In 1949, Ohly left the OSD to become Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program.
238
 By 1950, recognizing the need for a personnel expert in OSD, 
George C. Marshall (America’s third defense secretary) supported Anna M. Rosenberg’s 
nomination to serve as “Assistant Secretary of Defense with special relation to manpower 
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and personnel.”239 In a telegram to the Senate Armed Services Committee dated 29 
November 1950, Marshall writes:  
During my few weeks as Secretary, I found tremendous pressures regarding manpower 
coming up to me from no less than five different offices…and it was evident that the 
pressures would increase…relating to manpower in industry, manpower in the military 
forces, and manpower in the administrative system…Preparing for this problem, I found 
the consensus of opinion was that one of the outstanding experts in the United States was 
Mrs. Anna Rosenberg.
240
 
 
 
 Though the SASC unanimously reported her confirmation to the full Senate for a 
vote on 29 November 1950, Rosenberg’s confirmation battle was not over. On 2 
December, the committee reconvened to consider allegations that Rosenberg had been 
affiliated with the communist party in the 1930s.
241
 After several days of additional 
testimony, the committee found the allegations to be false.
242
 Rosenberg would go on to 
serve as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel through the 
remainder of the Truman administration.  
 Rosenberg’s tenure in the Pentagon is notable for several reasons. First, she 
served as one of the highest ranking women in the American defense establishment at a 
time when women did not occupy high level governmental positions. Second, her role as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel signifies the formal 
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bureaucratic establishment of an office dedicated to military personnel policy. Ad hoc 
arrangements like John Ohly’s policy portfolio or the Personnel Policy Board’s charter 
proved woefully inadequate to meet the demands of the post-World War military at war 
again in Korea.  
A key feature of any policy subsystem is a bureaucracy dedicated to the 
subsystem’s functional and substantive features. The National Security Act of 1947 and 
its subsequent amendment in 1949 to unify the Pentagon facilitated the creation of the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel and 
contributed to the military personnel policy subsystem’s establishment as an efficient 
policy subsystem. Though Rosenberg’s position as Assistant Secretary of Defense has 
since been elevated to Undersecretary of Defense, the precedent for a bureaucratic office 
in the Department of Defense had been set. That structure, built in 1950, remains largely 
intact today.  
Officer Personnel Act of 1947 
Simply identifying senior policymakers or establishing new bureaucratic offices 
to deal with manpower and personnel issues would be insufficient for tackling the 
military’s World War II demobilization and subsequent remobilization for the Korean 
War. Anticipating future military manpower and mobilization challenges, Congress took 
on the task of establishing a formal military personnel policy in late 1947.   
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General Eisenhower Goes to Washington 
In the years following the allied victories in Europe and the Pacific, few 
Americans enjoyed as much trust, credibility, and power as Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
Before his tenure as President of Columbia University, election as President of the United 
States, and famous farewell address deriding the military-industrial complex, Eisenhower 
served as 16
th
 Chief of Staff of the Army from 1945 to 1948. During his time as chief, 
Eisenhower was responsible for consolidating US military power abroad, shrinking a 
massive wartime army, and implementing a vision for the future of America’s armed 
forces. Among the countless issues to be addressed, Eisenhower spearheaded serious 
reforms to the military personnel management system.  
While numerous veterans went back to school, learned a trade, or opened their 
own business through the GI Bill, those still in uniform wrestled with the organizational 
challenges of a demobilized military and its greater institutional implications for 
America’s armed forces. Convinced that the only way to restructure the military and 
adequately prepare for the next threat to national security, Eisenhower testified before the 
recently established Senate Armed Services Committee in strong favor of “An act to 
provide for the promotion and elimination of officers of the Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps, and for other purposes,” commonly referred to as the Officer Personnel Act of 
1947.
243
 Though not just an army bill, Eisenhower as the former Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe and current Army Chief of Staff was the most prominent witness 
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called to testify. He even earned thanks and gratitude for appearing before the committee 
from Chairman Gurney of South Dakota.
244
          
Separating the “Deadwood” 
General Eisenhower, a savvy politician before ever holding elected office, framed 
his argument as a personnel crisis. Eisenhower asserted that the “lockstep” promotion 
system was “unsatisfactory” and that there were no adequate mechanisms in the law as it 
stood to rid the army of its “deadwood.” He was particularly referring to those officers 
lacking promotion potential but occupying billets that would better serve the army with 
more able and talented leaders. After “months of study to this bill,” Eisenhower 
contended, “I approve of it completely and thoroughly.” He even dismissed House 
amendments to the bill insisting that officer management was most important to him, 
signaling the degree to which he stood by the need for its passage and implementation. 
When prompted by the chairman, Eisenhower acknowledged a state of emergency in 
personnel management, in part, deriving from the air corps’ transition to the air force.245  
 As General Eisenhower made his entrepreneurial case for policy reform and 
addressed some of the measure’s details, committee members, like Millard Tydings of 
Maryland, could not help but emphatically support him and the bill.  
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SENATOR TYDINGS: One more question. This is a wartime measure, is it not, in the 
sense that you are trying to get an army that would be in the best shape to wage war if we 
had a war tomorrow morning after this bill was passed?  
GENERAL EISENHOWER: Practically speaking, that is it. 
SENATOR TYDINGS: This is not a peacetime measure, looking to the army in a time of 
peace. It is designed to make it vital, strong, and efficient when the hour of need really 
does come along. 
GENERAL EISENHOWER: That is correct.
246
 
 General Eisenhower’s role as a prominent policy entrepreneur and his strong 
advocacy for the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 enabled its timely passage. As a policy 
entrepreneur, Eisenhower adeptly managed the problem, politics, and policy streams 
during an open window of opportunity
247
 to usher in a military pension policy that 
facilitated both promotions and separations. Eisenhower clearly identified the 
unsatisfactory promotion system and senior personnel bloat as the source of the army’s 
problems. Further, he allayed political concerns that a change in personnel management 
would adversely affect the Engineer Corps
248
 (which played a vital role in infrastructure 
development in congressional districts throughout the United States) and offered his full 
throated support for the reform bill under consideration as the military’s policy solution. 
Finally, the crisis state of the personnel management system, as Eisenhower framed it, 
opened a window of opportunity in the name of national security that he could exploit.    
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An Institutional Personnel Framework  
In sum, the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 provided for the “up or out” promotion 
system in which career progression through the ranks is necessary for continued service; 
it laid out a general framework for officer career timelines at each grade; created 
additional mechanisms to eliminate poorly performing officers; called for selection 
boards to thoroughly review and consider officers for promotion; set age limits at each 
grade that trigger mandatory retirement; and set eligibility for voluntary retirement at 20 
years of service.
249
 In its entirety, the Officer Personnel Act created a consistent flow into 
and out of the military, opened billets for meritorious individuals to fill, and built the 
institutional personnel framework the military is largely left with today.
250
 Its impact 
cannot be understated. 
The American military faced tremendous challenges putting its institutional house 
in order following World War II. Among these challenges was culling the force to meet 
strategic aims for a postwar world. Doing so would require a policy instrument to 
separate mass amounts of service members from the military. While the GI Bill eased the 
civilian transition for separating service members, the Officer Personnel Act created an 
institutional mechanism to promote the most talented career oriented soldiers, sailors, 
airmen and marines while separating the rest with a pension after 20 years of service. 
This is the enduring policy legacy that the American military still lives with today.     
                                                          
249 US Statues at Large, 80th Congress, Session 1, Chapter 512, Pages 883-913, 07 August 1947. Available 
from http://constitution.org/uslaw/sal/061_statutes_at_large.pdf; Internet. 
250 Cindy Williams, ed., Filling the Ranks: Transforming the US Military Personnel System, (Cambridge, 
MIT Press: 2001), 8-9.  
105 
 
Summary 
 This chapter aims to substantiate subsystem split hypothesis. More specifically, I 
argue that veterans’ pension policy and military personnel policy effectively split into 
two separate subsystems in the wake of World War II, significantly reducing the number 
of institutions and actors interested in military personnel policy. At the core of this 
subsystem split is legislative reorganization facilitated by the Servicemen’s Readjustment 
Act of 1944, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, National Security Act of 1947, and 
Officer Personnel Act of 1947.   
First, in lieu of adjustment compensation or a pension, the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944 granted compensation to an entire generation of veterans in the 
form of tuition benefits, vocational training, and home, farm, and small business loans. 
These various policy instruments proved far more effective forms of compensation than 
any service pension in American history. Second, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946 combined congressional committees and delineated jurisdictions, separating 
veterans’ pension policy from military personnel policy. Additionally, the LRA 
strengthened bureaucratic oversight of the National Military Establishment. Third, the 
National Security Act of 1947 subordinated the Departments of War and the Navy to the 
new Secretary of Defense. Though OSD struggled in its early years, Secretary Forrestal’s 
pick in John Ohly to serve as his special assistant with expertise in manpower 
foreshadowed the creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and 
Personnel, formalizing the bureaucratic office responsible for personnel policy. Finally, 
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the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, championed by General Eisenhower, created an “up or 
out” promotion system tied to a 20 year retirement policy, thereby creating a mechanism 
to promote and separate service members from the military. Without a doubt, the 
evidence supports subsystem split hypothesis.      
The formation of the military personnel policy subsystem and its split from 
veterans’ pension policy also served a more practical purpose – it minimized the scope of 
conflict between actors and institutions. Like any policy subsystem, the inchoate military 
personnel policy subsystem aimed to dominate its policy area. With veterans’ pension 
policy no longer in its jurisdiction, it could focus on its primary goal: to recruit, retain, 
separate, and reward service members.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Veterans’ pension policy has been one of the cornerstones of American political 
development scholarship for nearly a century. While scholars like Henry Glasson, 
Richard Bensel, Theda Skocpol, Laura Jensen, Stephen Ortiz and others have redefined 
this well-trodden path with their fascinating and important works, none of them used the 
dynamic veterans’ pension policy subsystem as a framework for understanding pension 
policy development. This master’s report takes aim at the historical record and prior 
scholarship through a subsystems lens and brings to life the dynamism in the pension 
policymaking process. By exploring subsystem formation, interest group lifecycle, 
bureaucratic consolidation, and subsystem split hypotheses this paper clearly 
substantiates its four primary claims and provides an opportunity for research on military 
personnel and retirement policy going forward.  
First, a dynamic veterans’ pension policy subsystem did, in fact, emerge in the 
wake of the Civil War. This subsystem was hardly autonomous as Daniel McCool 
asserts. Rather, the early days of the subsystem proved quite contested as dissident 
groups and elite policy entrepreneurs attempted to slow the growth of veterans’ pensions. 
However, political patronage in the Pension Bureau, sympathetic members of Congress, 
and powerful interests like the GAR, pension attorneys, and claim agents ultimately 
pushed the pension policy toward the nation’s limits of generosity.   
Second, just as the GAR emerged to support veterans of the Civil War era, so too 
did organizations like the American Legion and VFW. Unlike the GAR, the Legion and 
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VFW did not tie its organizational identity to one event, conflict, or war. Consequently, 
the Legion and VFW still thrive as powerful interests in the veterans’ lobby; whereas, the 
GAR slowly faded away throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The important 
take away with regard to interest group lifecycles is that a resilient policy subsystem can 
absorb new and relevant actors and institutions entering the policy arena, just as it can 
discard old and irrelevant actors and institutions leaving it. 
Third, bureaucratic consolidation of the disparate agencies across government 
working on veterans issues into one Veterans’ Bureau, and later the Veterans’ 
Administration, proved paramount to the effective delivery of veterans’ services. Though 
an early spat of corruption by the bureau’s director undermined his innovative 
administrative methods, the next director successfully ushered in an era of agency 
professionalism and efficient delivery systems over the next two decades. This 
consolidation ultimately gave the Veterans’ Administration sole domain over veterans’ 
pension policy. 
Fourth, legislative reorganization at the end of World War II effectively split the 
veterans’ pension policy subsystem from what is now the military personnel policy 
subsystem. The GI Bill granted a generation of veterans significant education, vocation, 
and financial benefits without resorting to pensions or an adjusted compensation lump 
sum. The LRA of 1946 split veterans’ policy from military policy, giving HASC and 
SASC sole authority over matters of military pay, retirement, and other personnel 
policies. Moreover, the LRA strengthened congressional oversight of the National 
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Military Establishment, later becoming the Department of Defense. Next, the National 
Security Act of 1947 created the Secretary of Defense and OSD with later amendments 
renaming the National Military Establishment the Department of Defense. This would 
spur the subsequent creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and 
Personnel, establishing a formal bureaucratic office responsible for military personnel 
policy. 
More Questions 
More often than not, rigorous scholarship presents more questions than answers. 
This report certainly falls into that category. Now that the development of veterans’ 
pension policy over the course of American history is clearer, the larger dissertation 
project is left to address four new research questions regarding contemporary military 
personnel and retirement policy and the subsystem that controls it.  
First, with defense spending in decline and the policy problems apparently so 
clear, why has there been no substantive or durable change to military pension policy 
since the post-World War II era? Second, how does the type of subsystem generating 
policy outputs affect long term policy durability? Next, how does subsystem information 
processing facilitate policy change or stasis? Finally, what kind of institutional 
mechanisms lead to subsystem breakdown and policy change? Subsequent research 
should explore these research questions to explain the military personnel policymaking 
process, bring the military personnel policy subsystem to life, and contribute to gaps in 
the subsystem and information processing literatures. 
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Toward a Theory of Efficient Policy Subsystems 
I contend that the answer to these questions lies in the “efficiency” of the military 
personnel policy subsystem. To preview the central thesis of the forthcoming dissertation, 
an efficient policy subsystem is characterized by limited, expert-based channels of 
information, specialized media attention, parochial interest groups, and a politically 
inactive – yet advantaged – target population. Subsystem “efficiency” leads to 
information undersupply, requiring subsystem actors to rely on interinstitutional signals 
from policy elites to determine acceptable military personnel and pension policies. 
Information undersupply and the ensuing lack of subsystem conflict perpetuate policy 
stasis. Further, policies generated by an efficient policy subsystem are incapable of 
adapting to the demands of a dynamic policy environment. Among the most demanding 
of dynamic policy environments is postwar defense policy. At the end of a major 
American conflict, the military services struggle to recast themselves in the wake of war.  
Future Research Agendas 
The larger dissertation project weaves together three themes. The first theme is 
the American political development of veterans’ pension policy subsystem into the 
military personnel policy subsystem that this master’s report explores. Through a series 
of elite interviews, the second theme explores subsystem information processing within 
the military personnel policy subsystem to highlight its “efficiency,” or lack of conflict, 
in the policymaking process. The third theme examines blue ribbon defense commissions 
as institutional mechanisms to facilitate subsystem breakdown and policy change. While 
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the historical record points to US presidents as elite policy entrepreneurs attempting to 
break into subsystem policymaking, blue ribbon defense commissions in the latter half of 
the twentieth century and beyond have proven to be quite effective at this and merit 
scholarly treatment.     
In closing, seeing veterans’ pension policy as an historical evolution into the 
narrower and less contested domain of military personnel policy opens a whole new 
window into understanding the contemporary defense policymaking process. Most 
importantly, research of this sort and subsequent projects provide historical insights for 
policymakers and scholars looking to care for an entirely new generation of veterans 
returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
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